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I. INTRODUCTION: THE COURT STIRS THE TEMPEST IN STAUB 
“[W]hen Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of 
general tort law,” declared the Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.1 
The Court so labeled the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act (USERRA), a federal employment discrimination law. The Court 
did more than merely label a federal employment discrimination statute a tort 
in Staub; it proceeded to import the tort concept of proximate cause as the test 
for “cat’s paw” or subordinate bias liability.2 With the “federal tort” 
declaration and the importation of one of the most controversial and vexatious 
concepts in tort law into employment discrimination law, the Court provoked 
an onslaught of solicitous commentary and scholarship about the 
“tortification” of employment discrimination law3—including this 
Symposium. The proclamation in Staub was not the first time a Supreme Court 
opinion had suggested that employment discrimination law has a “tortiness” 
quality, nor was it the first time the Court had borrowed tort constructs or 
doctrines for use in employment discrimination law. Before Staub, however, 
there was little commentary4 and even less consternation5 over the relationship 
between tort law and civil rights and employment discrimination law. So, why 
all the fuss after Staub? 
Several reasons occur to me why Staub touched off a tempest about the 
Court’s tort labeling of employment discrimination law and incorporation of a 
tort law principle into employment discrimination law. First, the proclamation 
in Staub was the most direct statement by a majority opinion of the Court that 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). 
 2 The Court explained the cat’s paw issue as follows: “We consider the 
circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for employment discrimination 
based on the discriminatory animus of an employee who influenced, but did not make, the 
ultimate employment decision.” Id. at 1189. 
 3 See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A 
Proposal to Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447 (2013) 
[hereinafter Corbett, Unmasking]; Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, The 
Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Sperino, 
Discrimination]; Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 U. FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014) 
[hereinafter Sperino, Tort Label]; Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment 
Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012) [hereinafter Sullivan, Tortifying]. 
 4 See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil 
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2180–81 (2007) (observing that the 
relationship between the areas of tort law and civil rights law was undertheorized and 
proposing more migration in the other direction—from civil rights law to tort law to 
develop the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 5 See id. at 2120 (positing that some migration between the two bodies of law is 
desirable). 
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a federal employment discrimination law is a statutory tort.6 Second, the 
much-maligned tort concept of proximate cause7 was adopted with little to no 
analysis of the appropriateness of the construct for the issue at hand,8 when the 
adoption of the principle seemed wholly gratuitous and unnecessary to 
resolving the issue.9 Third, both the proclamation and the incorporation in 
Staub harkened back to the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision on the causation 
standard required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)—
Gross v. FBL Financial Services.10 In Gross, the Court rejected a less rigorous 
standard of causation and declared but-for causation, purportedly drawn from 
tort law,11 as the meaning of “because of” in the ADEA. Gross ensconced a 
rigorous standard of causation for age discrimination claims. Fourth, we all 
were left to wonder after Staub how tort law would next be deployed in 
employment discrimination law.  
Some scholars thought that the labeling in Staub and the cavalier 
incorporation of proximate cause might signal a troublesome perspective on 
the part of the Court and a trend in which employment discrimination law is 
regarded as essentially indistinct from tort law. Commentators recognized that 
the tortification did not emerge full grown in Staub, but rather the seeds of 
tortification were to be found in earlier decisions. We looked backward to 
                                                                                                                     
 6 Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
referred to Title VII as creating a “statutory employment ‘tort.’” Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 7 Proximate cause has fallen into disfavor with many, probably most, torts scholars, 
and the term been replaced by limitations based on scope of risks in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM, ch. 6, special note on proximate cause (2010). For further discussion of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts position on proximate cause, see infra note 210. Dean 
Mark Grady, in the course of offering a defense of proximate cause for its greater-than-
appreciated predictability and cohesiveness, recognized that many believe that proximate 
cause is basically incoherent and that its cases either cannot be predicted or that they 
illustrate some fundamental disorder of the common law. See Mark F. Grady, Proximate 
Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 294 (2002); see also Sperino, Discrimination, 
supra note 3, at 6 (quoting a leading torts treatise regarding the disagreement and 
confusion about proximate cause); Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 3, at 1459 (“Complaints 
about the nebulousness of the concept are numerous and longstanding, and there have been 
determined efforts to eradicate it from legal discourse.”). 
 8 The Court discussed agency principles applied in tort law and then announced that 
the inquiry whether the biased supervisor’s animus caused the adverse employment action 
by the unbiased supervisor “incorporates the traditional tort-law concept of proximate 
cause.” Staub v. Proctor Hosp. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011). 
 9 Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 3, at 1457. 
 10 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).  
 11 Although the majority in Gross did not label the ADEA a federal tort, it cited the 
Prosser and Keeton torts treatise in support of its decision to equate the statutory language 
“because of” with “but for.” Id. at 176–77 (citing KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)). 
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Gross, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,12 and one of us looked even as far back 
as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green13 to examine what influence and effect 
tort law has had on employment discrimination law over its fifty-year 
existence.14 Staub thus aroused anxiety about escalating tortification and a felt 
need to examine the historical record of this phenomenon, even before the 
Court began expressly applying the tort label to the discrimination statutes.  
The concerns prompted by Staub have not abated in the three years since 
the decision was rendered. Most of us think that we have been vindicated in 
our concerns by the Court’s decision in University of Texas Southwest Medical 
Center v. Nassar,15 in which the Court again talked torts as it extended its 
holding in Gross by interpreting “because of” in the antiretaliation provision in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to mean “but for” and signaled that 
but-for causation will be required for all statutes using “because of” language. 
The Court prefaced its adoption of but-for causation in Nassar with another 
declaration regarding the tortiness of employment discrimination law:  
It is thus textbook tort law that an action “is not regarded as a cause of an 
event if the particular event would have occurred without it.” This, then, is 
the background against which Congress legislated in enacting Title VII, and 
these are the default rules it is presumed to have incorporated, absent an 
indication to the contrary in the statute itself.16 
Thus, the trilogy of Gross–Staub–Nassar audaciously proclaims the 
escalating tortification of employment discrimination law.17  
The importation of tort law into employment discrimination is not 
inherently a bad thing. Yet, scholarly commentary on the subject since Staub 
has ranged from cautious to suspicious to highly critical. From the outset, 
however, we probably should acknowledge that some good could come from 
tortification, and it is unlikely that the Court will abandon the notion that it can 
and should import tort law into the common law of employment 
discrimination.18 A reasonable aspiration may be to persuade the Court and 
                                                                                                                     
 12 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 13 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 14 See Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, passim (contending that the pretext analysis 
of McDonnell Douglas is a thinly-veiled version of res ipsa loquitur). 
 15 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (holding, 
based on Gross, that but-for causation is required to prove retaliation under Title VII). 
 16 Id. at 2525 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 265). 
 17 See, e.g., Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1052 (describing the Supreme 
Court’s use of tort law to interpret the employment discrimination statutes as becoming 
“more robust and automatic”); id. at 1066 (“Together Staub, Gross, and Nassar represent a 
shift in the way the Supreme Court uses tort law.”). Professor Sperino organizes the 
periods of tortification into (1) the Pre-Tort Years, 1964–1988; (2) the Middle Years, 
1989–2008; and (3) the Modern Cases, 2009 to Present. Id. at 1055‒67. 
 18 I use “common law of employment discrimination” to denominate the vast body of 
case law developing theories and principles not expressly provided for in the statutes. 
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courts to undertake a more thoughtful and discriminating approach to this 
process. Indeed, I do not argue that tort law should never be used to develop 
employment discrimination law. Numerous tort principles, with or without 
modification, may serve employment discrimination law very well. The 
Supreme Court, however, has employed a retrograde view of the tort law 
available and deployed it in ways that have resulted largely in a complex and 
almost chaotic common law of employment discrimination, which ill serves 
the grand objectives of the statutes.  
What would best serve the law, after fifty years of discrimination law, is 
congressional intervention. Congress needs to examine a voluminous body of 
employment discrimination common law and amend the statutes in a 
comprehensive fashion. Such an undertaking could set the parameters for the 
use of tort law in discrimination law. Although I intend to make the case for a 
massive overhaul of the federal employment discrimination laws, I am not at 
all sanguine about the prospects for such. Over a period of fifty years, 
Congress has not necessarily neglected the statutes, but its primary approach to 
developing the law has been to leave it to the courts until it chooses to override 
particular Supreme Court decisions, sometimes overriding one at a time,19 and 
sometimes dispatching with several at once.20 There is nothing suggesting that 
Congress will undertake the kind of comprehensive reform that I think is 
warranted. Failing that, it is worthwhile to suggest some guidance for courts to 
use in deciding future incorporation and forbearance from incorporation of tort 
law.  
Part II addresses what it means to label employment discrimination laws 
federal torts and what is troubling about the Court’s application of the tort 
label and incorporation of tort law without adequate explanation and 
reasoning. First, I briefly chronicle the inception and development of the 
Court’s application of the tort label to employment discrimination law. 
Second, I consider several different concerns with the tort analogy and the 
importation of common law and tort law principles. Finally in Part II, I 
                                                                                                                     
 19 For example, with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 
Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.), Congress abrogated Ledbetter 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).  
 20 The most significant example of such a law is the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), 
which abrogated several Supreme Court decisions. Section 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, expressly 
identifies as one of the Act’s purposes “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate 
protection to victims of discrimination.” Another example is the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3533 
(codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.), which overturned several Supreme 
Court decisions restrictively interpreting the meaning of disability under the ADA. The 
issue of congressional overrides of the Court’s statutory interpretation in employment 
discrimination law is usefully treated in Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional 
Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 860 
(2012). The problem addressed by Professor Widiss will be discussed infra Part III.A.  
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consider the negative effects that application of the tort label and the 
incorporation of tort principles have had on employment discrimination law. 
In Part III, I offer two solutions that could ameliorate the problems of past 
tortification and could usher in future incorporations of tort law that should 
enhance employment discrimination law. First, I make the case that the time 
has come for Congress to re-engage in employment discrimination law by 
amending and updating the statutes. The Court and courts are creating much 
employment discrimination doctrine without adequate guidance from 
Congress. Congress can and should “get back in the game” and, in the process, 
send a message about the role of tort law in employment discrimination law. 
Second, recognizing that Congress is unlikely to oblige, I offer some 
guidelines for courts in the incorporation of tort law into employment 
discrimination law, which actually are culled from various Supreme Court 
opinions that have handled the incorporation issue well or not so well. After 
proposing those guidelines, I demonstrate the proposed analysis by applying 
the guidelines to a couple of tort principles that could be candidates for 
importation into discrimination law.  
II. THE TORT LABEL AND THE INCORPORATION OF TORT CONCEPTS INTO 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? 
What is troublesome about Staub and the so-called tortification of 
employment discrimination law? Is it the mere fact that the Court applies the 
tort label to employment discrimination law? Or is it the specific tort concepts 
that the Court is importing? Or is it the way the Court goes about adopting it? 
For me the answer is “yes, all three.” The most troubling thing about the 
Court’s resort to tort law to develop employment discrimination law, however, 
is that it is occurring at a juncture in the history of employment discrimination 
law when the case law has created a complex and confusing labyrinth of 
principles and doctrines, and the statutes have not been adequately amended 
and updated by Congress. Against the backdrop of outdated statutes, it is not 
clear how much tort law or what tort law courts should import into 
employment discrimination law. Moreover, the outdated statutes encourage 
importation of tort law or other law to populate a body of law that is still, fifty 
years after its inception, loosely defined by lean statutes which provide little 
guidance on principles and doctrine. 
A. The Tort Label  
Some have suggested that there is nothing inherently inappropriate about 
the Court or courts resorting to tort law to interpret and develop employment 
discrimination law. Professor Sullivan has argued that the negative reaction to 
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tort law gives too much weight to our rather artificial categorizations of law.21 
As Sullivan puts it, it’s all law, and there are a limited number of concepts to 
address each legal inquiry.22 Professor Sullivan finds the real issues of concern 
to be what tort law is adopted and whether that law is adequately adapted to 
serve the purposes of employment discrimination law.23 While I agree with 
most of what he says, I do not find application of “the tort label” by the Court 
to be innocuous. I see it as potentially pernicious—more than just introducing 
the Court’s borrowing of a tort construct. First, labeling employment 
discrimination laws as federal torts indicates a particular perspective about the 
discrimination laws that troubles me. Second, the Supreme Court has begun to 
use the labeling as the key to importing tort doctrines or principles without 
conducting any analysis of whether the tort law is well-suited to employment 
discrimination law and whether any adaptations may be needed to make it 
function well. The Court calls the employment discrimination laws “torts,” 
saying that Congress knew the common law background against which it 
enacted the laws, and then chooses a tort principle with little to no analysis.  
1. Beginning and Evolution of the Tort Label 
Initially, it is worth asking what the Court means when it affixes the tort 
label to employment discrimination laws. What is it about the laws causes the 
Court to label them torts? The Court provided no explanation in Gross, Staub, 
or Nassar, but there is some history worth exploring.  
Analogizing employment discrimination law to tort law is not self-evident. 
Early in the history of discrimination law not all courts24 and commentators25 
agreed that the tort characterization was appropriate or correct. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court itself expressed some reticence about adopting common law 
principles (agency law) for employment discrimination issues in Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson: “[S]uch common-law principles may not be 
                                                                                                                     
 21 See Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method?: Torts and Other 
Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079, 1079‒80 (2014) 
[hereinafter Sullivan, Is There a Madness]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 1080‒81.  
 24 See Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1979): 
But simply because the law of tort might be a source to evaluate the loss caused by 
discrimination does not necessarily mean discrimination claims should be saddled 
with the whole of tort doctrine. The discrimination cause of action is unique. It is not 
derived from the English common law of personal freedom, but is rather an outgrowth 
of the fundamental principle that everyone should be treated equally without regard to 
race, color or, as we have come to realize more recently, sex. 
 25 See, e.g., Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1235, 1242 (1988) (positing that because employment discrimination law is not 
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transferable in all their particulars to Title VII . . . .”26 The Court in Meritor 
did, however, follow the urging of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission to look to agency law for guidance in fashioning the employment 
discrimination standard.27  
It was Justice O’Connor who became the architect of tortifying 
employment discrimination law, beginning with her concurring opinion in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.28 In the course of sorting through torts standards 
of causation to choose one for the mixed-motives analysis in her 
concurrence,29 Justice O’Connor referred to Title VII as creating a “statutory 
employment ‘tort.’”30 However, a majority of the Court did not articulate that 
view. 
A few years after Price Waterhouse, in United States v. Burke, the Court 
considered whether settlement of a backpay claim under Title VII was 
excludable from gross income under the Internal Revenue Code.31 To come 
within the income exclusion, the legal basis for recovery had to be redress of a 
tort-like personal injury.32 The Court majority held that the recovery was not 
tortlike and thus not excludable. The majority stated that “one of the hallmarks 
of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to 
compensate the plaintiff . . . .”33 Title VII, the Court noted, did not permit 
recovery for “other traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as 
pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other 
consequential damages.”34 The Court responded to the argument that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 changed the remedial provisions and thus made Title VII 
claims “inherently tort-like in nature,” by explaining that although “Congress’ 
decision to permit jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages under 
the amended Act signals a marked change in its conception of the injury 
redressable by Title VII,” that change could not be attributed to the statute 
                                                                                                                     
common-law based, causal analysis perhaps should not play as critical a role as it does in 
negligence). 
 26 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 29 Justice O’Connor’s analysis of tort causation standards will be discussed in detail 
infra Part III.B.1. 
 30 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As Professor 
Bernstein chronicles, Justice O’Connor was the primary proponent of the thesis that 
employment discrimination law is statutory tort law. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual 
Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 510 (1997) (“[H]er colleagues on the 
Court have never effectively refuted Justice O’Connor’s cogent position that employment 
discrimination is a tort in all but name.”). 
 31 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241‒42 (1992) (ruling on taxability 
superseded by statute). 
 32 Id. at 237. 
 33 Id. at 235. 
 34 Id. at 239. 
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before the amendment.35 Dissenting, Justice O’Connor objected to the focus 
on the types of damages as the key to tortiness, and argued instead that it is the 
type of injury that is crucial. Relying on the Court’s having characterized the 
Reconstruction era civil rights laws as torts, she argued that “[d]iscrimination 
in the workplace being no less injurious than discrimination elsewhere, the 
rights asserted by persons who sue under Title VII are just as tort-like as the 
rights asserted by plaintiffs in actions brought under §§ 1981 and 1983.”36 
Thus, Justice O’Connor reasserted her view expressed in her Price 
Waterhouse concurrence that “Title VII offers a tort-like cause of action to 
those who suffer the injury of employment discrimination.”37  
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 removed the rationale of 
the Burke majority for declining to classify Title VII as tortlike. The enactment 
of § 1981a38 made capped compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials 
available for disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA). A strong critic of the tortification of employment 
discrimination law, Cheryl Zemelman, expressed her assessment in 1993 that 
there had been “a two-decade evolution of Title VII from a public policy-
enforcing statute, designed to promote employer responsibility, to a 
compensatory, tort-like statute, aimed at making victims whole . . . [such that] 
the privatization of Title VII has become so complete that once unthinkable 
characterizations of the statute now seem commonplace.”39 By the time of 
Gross and Staub, the O’Connor opinions in Price Waterhouse and Burke and 
the obviating of the Burke majority’s rationale by the 1991 Act had laid a 
foundation for declaring the discrimination laws to be statutory torts.  
2. Concerns About the Tort Label and Importation of Tort Law 
a. Is Employment Discrimination Law Tortlike? 
If the employment discrimination statutes are not tortlike, then the Court is 
wrong, and labeling them as such may obscure important distinctions between 
tort law and employment discrimination law. Over time we would expect this 
to result in the distinctions being minimized and discrimination law becoming 
more tortlike, perhaps to the detriment of the public policy and civil rights 
objectives of discrimination law. In other words, tortification of employment 
discrimination law may be a self-fulfilling prophecy that enervates the civil 
rights laws.  
                                                                                                                     
 35 Id. at 241 n.12. 
 36 Id. at 252 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 37 Burke, 504 U.S. at 254. 
 38 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012). 
 39 Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to 
Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of 
Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 188, 196 (1993). 
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We may begin, then, by asking whether the employment discrimination 
statutes are tortlike rather than accepting the Court’s recent proclamations as 
correct and viewing the laws as they have been shaped in the tort mold by the 
Court over the years. The answer is, based on the language of the statutes, “not 
necessarily.” What does the Court mean by the tort analogy? Although the 
Supreme Court uses the tort characterization principally to refer to a type of 
injury (personal injuries) and a type of damages (compensatory damages), 
there is much more to tort law. Professor Sandra Sperino argues that the 
language and structure of the discrimination statutes does not mimic tort law.40 
She explains that the statutes do not use tort terms of art, such as but-for 
causation and proximate cause,41 and the statutes do not set forth theories of 
discrimination couched in terms of a set of requisite elements.42 For example, 
it is black letter law that battery requires proof of three or four elements 
(depending on whether consent is classified as a defense): (1) a voluntary act; 
(2) intent; (3) a harmful or offensive contact; and perhaps (4) lack of 
consent.43 Negligence requires that the following elements be established: (1) 
duty; (2) breach; (3) cause in fact; (4) proximate or legal cause; and (5) 
compensable harm.44 Courts and factfinders examine tort claims by fitting 
evidence into these constructs, determining whether there is sufficient, and 
then preponderant evidence of each element. Failure to establish any one of 
the requisite elements results in no liability.45  
                                                                                                                     
 40 Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1070. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. (“[T]ort law has developed a preference for a small set of central elements that 
define each cause of action.”).  
 43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS §§ 28–32 (2000). 
 44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965); DOBBS, supra note 43, 
§ 114. 
 45 Although this is textbook American tort law, such an all-or-nothing approach is not 
the only way to articulate and evaluate claims. For example, a flexible approach to tort law 
need not require that each element be established to a certain level of proof but instead may 
permit that the elements be considered in interaction. If one element is not established or is 
weak, liability may be established and recovery permitted if other elements are very strong. 
See, e.g., HELMUT KOZIOL, BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A GERMANIC 
PERSPECTIVE 14–16 (Fiona Salter Townshend trans., 2012); Ken Oliphant, Uncertain 
Factual Causation in the Third Restatement: Some Comparative Notes, 37 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1599, 1626 (2011) (“The reasoning is underpinned by the theory of a flexible 
system developed by the Austrian legal theorist, Walter Wilburg. In a flexible system, a 
weakness in a given claim corresponding to one element of liability can be offset by 
showing unusual strength relative to another element of liability.” (footnote omitted)). One 
manifestation of such an approach is proportional liability and recovery based on 
probability of causation. A number of states in the U.S. recognize a version of this in lost 
chance of survival claims in medical malpractice wrongful death cases of uncertainty 
regarding causation. For further discussion of proportional liability and lost chance 
principles, see infra Part III.B.2.  
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The language of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA does not necessarily 
lead to the creation of required-element-based theories of discrimination. 
Essentially, the statutes prohibit employers from taking adverse employment 
actions because of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age or disability. 
Such statutes could be interpreted as inviting open-ended and flexible 
examination of available evidence to determine whether discrimination has 
occurred. However, within the first decade of discrimination law, the Supreme 
Court began fashioning proof structures or frameworks that developed the law 
along the lines of the inflexible approach of tort law. In 1973, in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green,46 the Court announced its now ubiquitous three-part 
pretext proof structure, which has been criticized for narrowly cabining 
analysis of individual disparate treatment claims—forcing evidence into 
artificial categories47 that do not obviously address whether a plaintiff was 
discriminated against because of a protected characteristic.48 A plaintiff’s 
failure to establish the elements of the stage one prima facie case or stage three 
pretext results in no liability. The required elements and the pigeonholing of 
evidence is a tort-like approach.49 Other proof structures would be developed 
by the Court for discrimination claims, but the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
analysis is remarkable for its tort-like analysis and organization of evidence 
into categories based on a list of elements. This example of tortification cannot 
be pushed too far, as the pretext framework and other proof structures have not 
been applied by all courts with the same level of dispositive rigidity in 
employment discrimination cases as the requisite-elements approach in tort 
law.50 Still, most courts do not diverge from the constraints of the McDonnell 
                                                                                                                     
 46 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 47 See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2324 (1995) (“The claim that we have ‘special’ rules for 
intentional discrimination cases creates a false ‘sense of closure’—a false belief that the 
law has already taken extraordinary steps to assist Title VII plaintiffs.” (footnote omitted)); 
Stephen W. Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the 
Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 371‒81 (1997) (exploring whether the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis is useful). 
 48 See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the 
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 57 (1996) (referring to pretext as a 
proxy for employment discrimination); Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in 
Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS. 
L. REV. 349, 392 (2007) (“[B]oth the federal McDonnell Douglas standard and the similar 
state court standards are a proxy for the following statement: These facts are material to 
determining whether there is evidence of discrimination.”). 
 49 I have argued elsewhere that the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis was perhaps 
the beginning of tortification of employment discrimination law because it essentially 
entailed the sub silentio incorporation of res ipsa loquitur into discrimination law. See 
Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, passim.  
 50 Compare, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“[E]stablishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and 
never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment 
motion in an employment discrimination case. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s failure to 
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Douglas pretext framework, and even among those that do, almost all feel 
constrained to at least pay lip service to it. Thus, the courts’ adherence to the 
proof structures makes employment discrimination more tortlike than the 
statutes require.  
The Court’s most significant importation of tort law into employment 
discrimination law has been the adoption of tort cause-in-fact standards. The 
adoption of tort law’s most basic causation standard, but-for causation, has 
made discrimination law look like tort law. The Court based this importation 
on the statutory language “because of.” As will be discussed further, this 
tortification was not required by the statutory language, notwithstanding the 
Court’s declaration in Gross that “because of” means but-for causation.51  
Some employment discrimination theories are tortier than others; most 
agree that sexual (and other) harassment is the discrimination theory that is 
most tortlike.52 The type of injury (personal injury consisting of emotional 
distress and dignitary harm sometimes accompanied by physical harm)53 and 
the damages awarded (after § 1981a was enacted as part of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991)54 cast sexual harassment as more tortlike than other employment 
                                                                                                                     
produce a comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case.”), with, e.g., Bell v. 
Crowne Mgmt., LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1232 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (“To the extent that 
Smith suggests the burden-shifting paradigm of McDonnell Douglas can be ignored in a 
case based on circumstantial evidence, freeing the plaintiff from any obligation to establish 
a prima facie case, it is in tension with a long line of Eleventh Circuit precedent.”). 
 51 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009). 
 52 See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 4, at 2127 (calling “workplace harassment [] the 
kind of employment discrimination that looks most like a tort”); cf. Bernstein, supra note 
30, at 451 (arguing that the lens of respect “reconciles competing perspectives on fault, 
simultaneously recognizing the tort-like wrong of sexual harassment and the Title VII 
emphasis on workplace discrimination”); Mark M. Hager, Harassment and Constitutional 
Tort: The Other Jurisprudence, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 279, 317 (1999) (“[H]ostile 
environment harassment under Title VII dwells in a twilight zone between discrimination 
and tort.”). 
 53 See Chamallas, supra note 4, at 2119 (describing the injury as “a multifaceted 
injury—with both a personal and social dimension”). But see Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple 
Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 833 (2005) (criticizing 
the Court’s view of “sexual harassment as an individual, tort-like injury” because that view 
“obscures the relationship between sexual harassment and sex discrimination, both of 
which occur because of group-based bigotry”). 
 54 In many cases of sexual harassment, the original Title VII remedies were largely 
ineffectual for redressing plaintiffs’ injuries because there was no adverse employment 
action resulting in a loss of pay, for which backpay could provide a remedy. The 1991 Act 
made compensatory and punitive damages available. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a 
(2012)). Section 2(1) states in part: “The Congress finds that . . . additional remedies under 
Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the 
workplace . . . .” Id. § 2(1); see also Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in 
Employment Discrimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 
747–51 (2008) (discussing the congressional response to the limited remedies available for 
redressing sexual harassment).  
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discrimination theories. Moreover, sexual harassment law is based on the 
requisite-elements approach of tort law. Hostile environment claims require 
proof of five elements, as enumerated by most courts, that must be established 
in order for a plaintiff to recover.55 One might expect that in this most tort-like 
subset of employment discrimination law, and, in this context, the borrowing 
of tort would be least troublesome. I think that is correct.  
Thus, the employment discrimination statutes do not manifestly create 
statutory torts. The Supreme Court, however, has imbued the common law of 
discrimination with tort characteristics, and Congress accentuated that with the 
1991 Act’s addition of compensatory and punitive damages.56  
b. Reservations About Importation of Common Law Principles 
There is a common law of torts. There also is and always will be a 
common law of employment discrimination, created as the Court and courts 
interpret the statutes. The common law of employment discrimination, 
however, should be constrained by the statutes based on a respect for the roles 
of the judicial and legislative branches.57 Courts should approach the 
migration of tort principles into employment discrimination law with caution 
and restraint rather than with the current promiscuity. A cautious approach is 
appropriate because tort law is primarily common law and employment 
discrimination law is principally statutory.58 Although this seems a mere 
truism, it suggests reasons for a careful and analytical approach to importation 
of tort common law—an approach that includes consideration of adoption only 
                                                                                                                     
 55 The elements are generally stated along the following lines: (1) that he or she 
belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee has been subject to unwelcome sexual 
harassment, such as sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other conduct of a 
sexual nature; (3) that the harassment must have been based on the sex of the employee; (4) 
that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of 
employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for 
holding the employer liable. See, e.g., Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 
798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010); Green v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 655 (5th 
Cir. 2002). 
 56 I wish to be clear that I do not think that the addition of compensatory and punitive 
damages and jury trials in the 1991 Act was a bad thing. On the contrary, I think it was 
needed. However, it removed the only ground of distinction between tort and employment 
discrimination relied on by the Court in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241‒42 
(1992) (ruling on taxability superseded by statute). 
 57 See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 20, at 860 (discussing the proper roles of the courts 
and Congress in lawmaking); cf. Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1083 
(explaining that resort to other bodies of law to interpret the employment discrimination 
statutes is permissible “only when Congress has not carefully enough defined the 
parameters of the inquiry”).  
 58 Although there is a large body of common law of employment discrimination, the 
law was created by statutes, and the statutes must be read and interpreted to create the 
common law. See, e.g., Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1083 (stating that 
courts’ resort to tort law or any other law should be constrained by the statutes).  
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with appropriate modifications. First, there is a general concern that common 
law terms of art and principles are not always appropriate for various statutory 
tasks. Second, there is a specific concern that the common law of employment, 
which includes contract and tort law, is dominated by employment at will, a 
principle that is in tension with the employment discrimination statutes. 
The common law has different baselines and norms than the employment 
discrimination laws.59 Some baselines of the common law of employment are 
the following: (1) neutrality or freedom of contract, meaning government 
should leave private contracting parties to their personal preferences; (2) 
minimal interference, meaning the economy functions best with minimal 
government interference; and (3) protection of employers’ property rights as 
owners against the competing claims of employees.60 Professors Theodore 
Blumoff and Harold Lewis, Jr., in 1990 criticized the Supreme Court for 
adopting common law causation standards that are ill-suited for the statutory 
tasks. The Supreme Court’s development of the law since 1990 has 
exacerbated the problem of common law baselines for development of 
statutory law, as will be discussed below regarding the causation debacle.61 
Beyond general reservations about common law principles being adopted 
for statutory work, there is a specific concern about the common law of 
employment law. The “elephant in the room” of the common law is 
employment at will.62 Employment at will is the basic governing principle63 
for employment termination in forty-nine of fifty states.64 Employment at will 
provides that, absent contractual, statutory, or other restrictions, an employer 
can fire an employee for any reason (often stated as “good reason, bad reason, 
or no reason at all”).65 Employment at will is a longstanding, deeply 
                                                                                                                     
 59 See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal 
Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 936–56 (1989) 
(identifying the first and third baselines); Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The 
Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 
1, 5 (1990) (identifying two of three baselines). 
 60 See Blumoff & Lewis, Jr., supra note 59, at 66–70. 
 61 See infra Part II.B. 
 62 See Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1068. 
 63 It often is referred to as a default rule or a rebuttable presumption. See, e.g., Rachel 
Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–5, 13 
(2010); J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal 
to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 349–50 (1995).  
 64 Forty-nine states are characterized as employment-at-will states. The Montana 
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987 removed that state from the list, 
although weakly. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2012). 
 65 See, e.g., Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (“All may 
dismiss their employe[e]s at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or 
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”), overruled on 
other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see also Cynthia L. 
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 
(1996) (stating that it is the “employer’s presumptive right to fire employees at will—for 
good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all”). 
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entrenched, and fundamental principle of employment law in the United 
States.66 When employees are terminated, many believe their termination is 
wrongful or unjustified. They experience it as a personal injury, and many 
want to sue their former employer for “wrongful termination” or “wrongful 
discharge.” Yet, in a nation dominated by employment at will, few plaintiffs 
can assert viable claims for wrongful discharge. However, plaintiffs who can 
allege terminations because of race, sex, age, etc. under the employment 
discrimination laws often have viable claims. Thus, the most significant source 
of legal protection against unjust termination in the United States is the 
employment discrimination laws. Employment discrimination law necessarily 
impinged on employment at will from the beginning because Title VII 
expressly states that discharge is an adverse employment action for which 
discrimination is prohibited.67 Over its life, employment discrimination law 
increasingly has come into tension with employment at will as the number of 
discriminatory discharge claims has increased.68 In the early years after 
enactment of Title VII, most claims were based on refusal to hire, but over the 
years the majority of claims have become discharge claims. Thus, courts 
should hesitantly adopt common law to perform the statutory tasks of the 
employment discrimination laws.69 The Court once expressed this view in 
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson: “[S]uch common-law principles may 
not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII . . . .”70 Before adopting 
common law, courts should carefully consider both the influence of 
employment at will on the common law and the need to develop employment 
discrimination law that adequately displaces employment at will.71 
                                                                                                                     
 66 See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine 
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (“To understand the 
American system, therefore, it is necessary to understand the doctrine of employment at 
will, its fundamental assumptions, and its ambivalence. More importantly, it is necessary to 
recognize where that fundamental assumption has shaped our labor law.”). 
 67 “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer [] to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).  
 68 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that 
“[h]iring charges outnumbered termination charges by 50 percent in 1966, but by 1985, the 
ratio had reversed by more than 6 to 1”); see also Statutes by Issue FY 2010 – FY 2013, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/statutes_by_issue.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LC3-J7MV (showing EEOC statistics of large percentage of charges filed 
from 2010 to 2013 based on discharges). 
 69 See Blumoff & Lewis, Jr., supra note 59, at 70 (“At first blush, it seems almost 
inherently inconsistent to speak of the survival of common-law economic and political 
premises in light of a statutory scheme which, while stopping short of requiring just cause 
for discharge, is an undoubted encroachment on the doctrine of employment at will.”) 
(footnote omitted)). 
 70 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 71 Professor Sperino poses the analysis that courts should conduct as follows:  
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One may argue, however, that it is not the entirety of the common law that 
is dominated by employment at will; rather, it is the common law of contracts 
and employment law. However, in the realm of the common law, tort law 
interacts with employment at will, and courts generally have subordinated tort 
law principles to employment at will. Consider, for example, two tort theories 
urged by plaintiffs in termination cases: (1) wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy; and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both tort 
theories routinely are subordinated to employment at will by courts that 
express concern about permitting tort law to dilute the venerable employment-
at-will doctrine.  
Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy could have developed as 
a significant restriction on abusive discharges.72 Indeed, if it had developed as 
the abusive discharge tort proposed by Professor Lawrence Blades,73 it would 
have been a formidable tort counterweight to employment at will. Instead it 
has developed as a feckless tort that is barely worth mentioning as a limitation 
on employment at will. While most states recognize a tort denominated as 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, it is notoriously hard for 
plaintiffs to recover under the tort theory.74 Courts often explain their 
constrained development and application of the tort by declaring the need to 
preserve employment at will.75  
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), or the tort of outrage, is 
a tort of general application that was not designed specifically for employment 
law or terminations, as was wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 
As difficult as it has been for plaintiffs generally to recover for IIED, plaintiffs 
in employment cases, particularly those involving terminations, have found 
                                                                                                                     
If Congress meant to alter the common law relationship in a significant way, did it 
also mean to fully retain common law meanings for core statutory words? If so, which 
words and concepts retained their common law meanings and how are these meanings 
changed by the limits Congress imposed on employers’ ability to make decisions 
based on protected traits? 
Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1069.  
 72 See Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 
37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 656 (2000) (describing wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy (“WDVPP”) as “[t]he most significant limitation on the employment-at-will 
doctrine [that] has arisen from tort law”). 
 73 See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting 
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1423 (1967). 
 74 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 63, at 392–402. 
 75 See, e.g., Briggs v. Nova Servs., 213 P.3d 910, 914 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (stating 
that “the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a narrow exception to 
this employment at-will doctrine” and that “[t]he exception should be applied cautiously so 
as to not swallow the rule”); Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369 
(Wis. 2002) (expressing reluctance to broaden the narrow tort theory of recovery because 
employment at will is a “stable fixture” of the common law of the state and is “central to 
the free market economy”); White v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 837 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing a narrow exception to employment at will). 
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courts particularly reluctant to permit recovery.76 As with wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy, courts fear permitting a substantial tort incursion 
on employment at will.77 Some courts adopting such a restrictive approach to 
IIED have cited a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “The actor is 
never liable . . . where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights 
in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is 
certain to cause emotional distress.”78 Believing that employment at will is a 
sacrosanct principle of law, some courts fear that permitting recovery for one 
termination case under IIED will open the floodgates and jeopardize 
employment at will.79 
Beyond the two tort theories of recovery that have proven ineffectual in 
the teeth of employment at will, various tort principles have succumbed. For 
example, in Quebedeaux v. Dow Chemical Co.,80 the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana considered the case of an employee who was claiming damages for 
a battery by a co-employee. The plaintiff was fired for his involvement in the 
altercation, and he claimed damages for the battery he suffered. Although his 
physical harm was minimal, he claimed damages from the termination, 
including lost future wages and benefits. The court of appeals had permitted 
recovery under the tort principle of extended liability. For intentional torts, 
plaintiffs may recover all damages flowing from the tort, regardless of 
foreseeability.81 The state supreme court recognized the tension between the 
extended liability principle of tort law and the employment-at-will doctrine 
and resolved it in favor of employment at will: “[V]ictim compensation, which 
is one of the primary policies supporting vicarious liability, must give way to 
                                                                                                                     
 76 Interestingly, the first major criticism of the tortification of employment law was a 
criticism of the tort theory of IIED being used in the employment context. See Dennis P. 
Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case 
Against “Tortification” of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 392 (1994). 
 77 In 1994, Professor Duffy declared that “the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
either do not recognize the tort in the employment at will context, or place severe 
restrictions on liability in that context.” Id. at 391; see also Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 157–58 (2003) (describing reluctance of courts to permit IIED to be 
used as a backdoor wrongful discharge claim); Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the 
Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 
1702 (1996) (“Despite the apparent openness of the tort, infliction claims by employees 
rarely succeed.”). Although there has been some expansion of application of IIED to 
terminations in some states since Duffy’s statement, there is still considerable reticence on 
the part of courts.  
 78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965). 
 79 See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 
(Tex. 1992) (stating “there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine” if the 
court permitted recovery under IIED). 
 80 Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 820 So. 2d 542 (La. 2002). 
 81 Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 809 So. 2d 983, 989 (La. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 
820 So. 2d 542 (La. 2002). 
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the employment-at-will doctrine, which furthers broader societal policies, such 
as maintaining a free and efficient flow of human resources.”82 
In thinking about the importation of common law tort principles into 
employment discrimination, insight can be gained by considering migration of 
principles in the other direction—from employment discrimination law to tort 
law. Professor Martha Chamallas chronicled such a migration of law and 
encouraged further importation of the law of hostile environment sexual 
harassment to develop the tort law of IIED.83 She described it as “an 
interpretive process by which courts selectively borrow from the statutory 
domain to give more concrete meaning to tort standards.”84 She compared this 
migration process to the judicial practice of borrowing safety standards from 
statutes and using them to make more precise the standard of care in common 
law negligence claims. “The underlying idea is that it is beneficial that 
statutory norms find their way into tort law to insure that common law 
adjudication reinforces legislative priorities and responds to changing cultural 
sensibilities.”85 The converse proposition is not equally strong. When 
borrowing from the common law to interpret and develop statutory law, courts 
should be careful that they do not misinterpret or frustrate legislative priorities, 
as has happened in employment discrimination law, specifically in the use of 
tort causation standards to interpret the statutory language “because of.”86 
Moreover, Professor Chamallas noted the most important and challenging part 
of the importation process: “Once a determination is made that courts in tort 
actions may appropriately borrow from civil rights, however, there remains the 
difficult question of precisely which concepts should be borrowed and how 
much overlap there should be between the two domains.”87 Indeed, it is not the 
general principle of migration but the specific importation that merits careful 
analysis.  
Using again Chamallas’s example of courts borrowing statutory safety 
standards for determining breach in negligence claims, courts do not do so 
without carefully analyzing whether the statutory standard is appropriate to the 
fact situation, whether it adds precision to the common law standard, whether 
it was intended to protect the type of plaintiff seeking recovery in the case, and 
whether it was intended to cover the type of harm for which the plaintiff seeks 
recovery.88 Considering importation from employment discrimination law to 
tort law, two insights should inform migration of law in the other direction, the 
subject here: (1) the concern should be greater that legislative purpose and 
priorities not be frustrated by the importation; and (2) the analysis of which 
                                                                                                                     
 82 Quebedeaux, 820 So. 2d at 546. 
 83 Chamallas, supra note 4, passim. 
 84 Id. at 2183. 
 85 Id.  
 86 See infra Part II.B. 
 87 Chamallas, supra note 4, at 2183. 
 88 See Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 590–91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965); DOBBS, supra note 43, §§ 134‒38. 
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law appropriately may be imported should be at least as careful and 
discriminating as it is in the statutory-to-common-law migration.  
 In sum, courts should be careful when importing tort constructs and 
principles to interpret the employment discrimination statutes and to develop 
that body of law. Such an approach is necessary because of concerns with 
common law doing statutory tasks generally and with the common law of 
employment doing the work of employment discrimination statutes 
specifically.  
c. Reservations About Importation of Tort Law Principles 
I think Congress—at least Congress in 1964—would have recoiled at Title 
VII being labeled a statutory tort. I hope that Congress in 2014 would object to 
the characterization. The label denigrates the different balance of objectives 
and policies in tort law and employment discrimination law.89 Although both 
bodies of law share some objectives and policies, such as deterring harmful 
conduct and compensating injured parties, that does not mean that their 
priorities are the same.  
Tort law is a big, diverse, complex, and constantly changing body of law 
that often is described as incoherent,90 or lacking “a central theoretical 
unifying theory, aim, principle, or foundation.”91 When it comes to theoretical 
underpinnings and principal objectives, tort law is multifaceted92 and perhaps 
schizophrenic, described and animated by different schools of thought, 
theories, and objectives. The principal theories about tort law often are 
grouped into two schools of thought: the instrumentalist/social utility school, 
which emphasizes deterrence and compensation objectives, and the corrective 
justice school, which focuses on the moral importance of doing justice 
between or among the parties by requiring wrongdoers to correct the wrongful 
losses they occasion.93 There are many ways to subdivide the theories and 
                                                                                                                     
 89 I have made this argument elsewhere. See Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, at 
461–62. 
 90 See DOBBS, supra note 43, § 7. 
 91 See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Apportionment, Victim Reliance, and Fraud: A 
Comment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1043–44 (2006) (explaining that tort law reflects many 
influences over time—which is not well explained by a top-down intelligent design 
theory—and using Bruce Springsteen’s Mama’s Soup Surprise to illustrate the point); see 
also Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1082 (“[T]ort law lacks a consistent unifying 
theory or even a manageable menu of theoretical considerations.”). 
 92 See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
578 (2003) (“Tort law is a multifaceted enterprise, so it is no surprise to see that each 
theory brings something to the table . . . .”). 
 93 Green, supra note 91, at 1042 (crediting the late Professor Gary Schwartz with 
recognizing that torts includes strands of both corrective justice and deterrence); Jeffrey 
O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in Personal Injury Tort 
Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 137, 138–39 (1999) (describing theories of deterrence, compensation, and 
1046 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
perhaps the objectives.94 Interwoven with these theories and objectives is a 
balancing of concern with public versus private concerns. For example, tort 
law often aims to improve society, and it seeks to address private wrongs and 
private harms.95 I am not undertaking here the ambitious enterprise of 
resolving the best theory of describing or prescribing tort law. Torts scholars 
have been engaged in that debate for some time. It is sufficient for my 
purposes to suggest that the priority of objectives in tort law and the balance of 
public versus private concern do not always align with employment 
discrimination law, nor should they. 
Although tort law and employment discrimination law share the objectives 
of deterrence and compensation, the prioritizing or balancing of those 
objectives in tort law is uncertain and perhaps variable depending on the 
particular facts or pocket of tort law (for example, toxic torts compared with 
battery of an individual), whereas Congress and the Supreme Court have been 
clear that deterrence is the preeminent objective of the federal employment 
discrimination laws. The Supreme Court and other courts have declared this 
priority,96 and Congress has indicated the same in both Title VII as originally 
enacted and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.97 A focus on deterrence is to be 
                                                                                                                     
corrective justice); Anthony J. Sebok, Using Comparative Torts Materials to Teach First-
Year Torts, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 573–74 (2007) (discussing corrective justice and 
deterrence theories); Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1083. 
 94 See Goldberg, supra note 92, at 514–16 (subdividing the theories).  
 95 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1509–10 (2009). 
 96 The Court discussed the dual goals of deterrence/eradication of discrimination and 
compensation in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413–25 (1975). The Court 
identified the “primary objective” of Title VII as “achiev[ing] equality of employment 
opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable 
group of white employees over other employees.” Id. at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The Court 
then went on to recognize that “[i]t is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole 
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Id. at 418. In her 
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, after Justice O’Connor applied the “statutory tort” 
label to Title VII, she noted the two primary functions of Title VII: the deterrence goal 
related to public policy and the compensation or make-whole goal. Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Third Circuit 
eloquently expressed the preeminence of the public policy:  
[A]n act of employment discrimination is much more than an ordinary font of tort law. 
The anti-employment discrimination laws are suffused with a public aura for reasons 
that are well known . . . . A plaintiff in an employment-discrimination case 
accordingly acts not only to vindicate his or her personal interests in being made 
whole, but also as a ‘private attorney general’ to enforce the paramount public interest 
in eradicating invidious discrimination.  
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 
1034 (1995). 
 97 Before the 1991 amendments, Title VII provided for equitable relief, which 
included the possibility of a back pay award, but not compensatory and punitive damages. 
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expected of federal statutes that declare the strong public policy of eradicating 
invidious discrimination in employment. Although deterrence and 
compensation often are both served by a particular outcome, this is not always 
the case in torts,98 and—as the remedies available under the employment 
discrimination statutes as amended by the 1991 Act indicate—it often is not 
the case under the discrimination laws. 
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted, the principal remedy 
available for employment discrimination claims under the federal statutes 
(except the ADEA and Section 1981) was equitable relief, including backpay 
and affirmative injunctive relief such as reinstatement.99 Although it is true 
that equitable relief, including backpay, can serve the twin goals of deterrence 
                                                                                                                     
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012); see also supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text 
and infra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added the 
possibility of compensatory and/or punitive damages in Title VII and ADA cases in which 
they previously were not available, but such damages were made available for only 
disparate treatment (intentional) discrimination claims, not disparate impact (unintentional) 
discrimination claims, and the damages were capped depending on the size of the 
employer. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072‒74 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012)). 
 98 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie & Bernard Guyer, Injury as a Field of Public Health: 
Achievements and Controversies, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267, 270 (2002) (“Operationally, 
however, they may converge (e.g., punishment of wrongdoers or imposition of liability can 
achieve preventive effects through deterrence) or diverge (e.g., the risk of tort liability 
faced by companies often reduces hazards, but sometimes creates disincentives to disclose 
safety information and may thereby retard safety innovation).”); cf. Mark A. Geistfeld, The 
Coherence of Compensation-Deterrence Theory in Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 415 
(2012) (“[T]he functions of compensation and deterrence do not obviously cohere into a 
viable theory of tort law.”). 
 99 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see also supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
Race discrimination claims, which could be asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in addition to 
Title VII, and age discrimination claims under the ADEA’s different remedial scheme, 
modeled on the Fair Labor Standards Act, were the exceptional claims for which damages 
were available. Regarding the assertion of race claims under § 1981, see United States v. 
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 240 (1992) (“42 U.S.C. § 1981[] permits victims of race-based 
employment discrimination to obtain a jury trial at which both equitable and legal relief, 
including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages may be 
awarded.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Regarding the ADEA remedial scheme and 
how it differs from that of Title VII because it was modeled on the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C. 
§ 626(b) (2012) (“Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall 
be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of 
sections 216 and 217 of [the FLSA].”); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584–85 
(1978) (“[T]he ADEA incorporates the FLSA provision that employers ‘shall be liable’ for 
amounts deemed unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation, while under Title VII, 
the availability of backpay is a matter of equitable discretion[.] [R]ather than adopting the 
procedures of Title VII for ADEA actions, Congress rejected that course in favor of 
incorporating the FLSA procedures even while adopting Title VII’s substantive 
prohibitions.” (citation omitted)). 
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and compensation, full compensation was not achieved in many cases.100 The 
1991 Act added compensatory and punitive damages, subject to caps, for 
claims of disparate treatment (intentional) discrimination, under Title VII and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act for which damages were not otherwise 
available.101 However, such damages were not extended to claims of disparate 
impact.102 Thus, compensation took on a more important place in employment 
discrimination than it previously had occupied, but only in cases of intentional 
discrimination.  
The primacy of deterrence over compensation as reflected in the remedies 
available is even more clearly demonstrated by another part of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 that codified the mixed-motives proof structure in Title VII.103 A 
plaintiff pursuing a Title VII claim under mixed motives can recover 
compensatory (and perhaps punitive) damages and backpay if the plaintiff 
proves that the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the 
defendant employer’s adverse employment action and the defendant fails to 
prove the same-decision defense (that it would have taken the same action for 
nondiscriminatory reasons). However, if the defendant proves the same-
decision defense, which means the employer disproves but-for causation, then 
only nonmonetary relief (other than possible attorney’s fees)—not even 
backpay or reinstatement—is available.104 Because of the importance of 
deterrence, declaratory and some injunctive relief is available upon proof of 
less than but-for causation, but the plaintiff receives no monetary 
compensation. Congress in the statute sought to achieve the public policy of 
deterrence in cases involving a relatively weak showing of causation although 
it was not willing to compensate private plaintiffs in such cases. Thus, while 
elevating the compensatory objective of Title VII and the ADA, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 maintained the primacy of the deterrence objective. 
Although deterrence and compensation both may be served by outcomes under 
the employment discrimination statutes, Congress has fashioned the laws to 
further the deterrence objective even in cases in which it chooses not to 
advance fully the compensation objective.  
While deterrence is the primary objective of employment discrimination 
law, it is arguable that compensation is at least an equally important objective 
of tort law.105 As demonstrated above, these goals do not necessarily coincide 
                                                                                                                     
 100 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 427–28 (1999). 
 101 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012). 
 102 See id.  
 103 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 104 See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 105 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1439, 1439 (2001) (“Primarily through tort law the courts compensate those injured 
by others. Secondary aspects of our work such as deterrence or forcing tortfeasors to pay 
the full social costs of their activities are minor and collateral.”); cf. DOBBS, supra note 43, 
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in employment discrimination law. Closely associated with the priority of 
objectives in employment discrimination law is the primacy of the public 
policy function over the private function.106 If the Court persists in 
characterizing employment discrimination law as a tort, it may blur the priority 
given to deterrence and public policy in employment discrimination law and 
the willingness to advance the deterrence objective for public policy reasons 
even when it is not appropriate to advance the compensation objective for 
private plaintiffs. This result already has manifested itself in the Court’s 
decisions in Gross and Nassar to interpret the federal statutes as not permitting 
use of the mixed-motives framework (and its lower standard of causation) 
except where expressly provided by Congress. It is important for courts to 
understand and articulate the primacy of the deterrence objective and to 
recognize that, in employment discrimination law, sometimes deterrence 
should be advanced when compensation should not. 
A second important distinction that should be maintained between 
employment discrimination law and tort law is that corrective justice, which 
contends as a major school of thought and objective and theory of tort law, has 
a more ambiguous role in employment discrimination. The corrective justice 
view of tort law is essentially that “wrongful losses ought to be corrected by 
wrongdoers.”107 That is, one party has done wrong to another and caused 
harm, and morally the situation ought to be rectified. Arguably, employment 
discrimination law includes requirements and permissions that go beyond 
corrective justice.108 Corrective justice would not be inclined to impose 
liability in several situations in which employment discrimination law does—
probably including failure to make reasonable accommodation and disparate 
impact.109 Regardless, corrective justice theorists in tort law generally insist 
                                                                                                                     
§ 10 (“Compensation of injured persons is one of the generally accepted aims of tort 
law.”). 
 106 See supra note 96 and accompanying text; cf. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978) (“[T]he plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to 
vindicate ‘a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.’”) (quoting Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))). 
 107 See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 93, at 574. 
 108 See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 405, 407 (contending that distributive justice is more descriptive of 
employment discrimination law because it goes beyond remedying wrongs to achieving a 
vision of fairness and equality in jobs); Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil 
Rights Protection: An Alternative to Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 
24–25 (describing antidiscrimination law as going beyond corrective justice “with a 
vengeance”). Examples often cited include the requirement of reasonable accommodations 
for disabilities and religion and the permissibility of voluntary affirmative action that meets 
certain criteria. See, e.g., Suk, supra, at 414–15; Zatz, supra, at 24–25. 
 109 See Suk, supra note 108, at 426–27, 438 (“[C]ourts tend to reinforce a corrective 
justice understanding of the law, which in turn makes courts weak in enforcing disparate 
impact, reasonable accommodation, and hostile work environment problems.”). 
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upon a strong version of causation as a predicate to permitting recovery.110 As 
will be discussed below, the courts’ debate over causation in employment 
discrimination law has created the most chaotic and asymmetrical feature of 
this area of law.111 Arguing as I do for a lower standard of causation in 
discrimination law, I think a principal tenet of corrective justice theory in tort 
law fits poorly with employment discrimination law, and I think Congress 
indicated this in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, although the Supreme Court in 
Gross and Nassar did not so interpret the law. Thus, another aspect of tort law 
that does not always fit well with employment discrimination law is the 
influence of corrective justice theory.  
Employment discrimination is not the only area of the law which has been 
saddled with a tort analogy that does not necessarily, or always, correlate well. 
Writing about toxic torts and pollution, a commentator expressed concerns 
about the appropriateness of tort law to address the problems: “But if the 
problem, in fact, is not really a tort at all, those remedies will not only fail to 
further tort objectives but will also fail to achieve other vital objectives 
relevant to the actual problem.”112 As with employment discrimination, in 
toxic torts, causal indeterminacy presents problems for the victims.113  
Ultimately, then, calling employment discrimination law a tort fails to 
acknowledge a different mix and balancing of objectives between the two 
areas of law. Failing to account for this difference is likely to result in a body 
of law that is less favorable to recovery than Congress intended.  
If I am correct about the meaning of the tort label, why would the Court 
use it to suggest that employment discrimination law is primarily about 
compensating injury victims? Perhaps the Court thinks that the public policy 
of reducing, if not eradicating, discrimination has been largely achieved. On 
the other hand, the Court may think that the public policy is unattainable and 
the best that can be done is compensation of injured persons. It is hard to say 
what the Court thinks, but equating employment discrimination law and tort 
law suggests to me that the lofty purpose of discrimination law has been, or is 
being, enervated. 
                                                                                                                     
 110 See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A 
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 249, 285 (2003) (“[C]ausation for 
corrective justice theorists is perhaps the most vital component of the torts action”); 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 439, 439 (1990). 
 111 See infra Part II.B. 
 112 Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to 
Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 575, 587 (1983). 
 113 Id. at 584. 
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B. What Harms Have the Tort Label and Unreasoned Importation of 
Tort Law Caused? 
So much for abstract concerns about the tortification of employment 
discrimination law based on differences between employment discrimination 
law on the one hand and common law and tort law on the other. Although the 
Court has only recently begun audaciously declaring that employment 
discrimination laws are torts in the Gross–Staub–Nassar trilogy, the process 
has been ongoing for many years. Has it caused any real harm to employment 
discrimination law? Yes, and the greatest harm has been done by the greatest 
borrowing from tort law—cause-in-fact analysis. The incorporation of tort 
cause-in-fact standards is a debacle that has rendered the common law of 
employment discrimination asymmetrical and chaotic.  
Most chronicles of the adoption of tort causation standards begin with 
Price Waterhouse in 1989 and move forward to Gross in 2009.114 Nassar is 
part of the progression, but it is merely an extension of Gross. Few recent 
commentaries dig down past Price Waterhouse for the tortification through 
adoption of cause-in-fact standards. Professor Sperino labels 1964–1988 the 
“Pre-Tort Years.”115 It certainly is true that the Court did not talk much about 
tort law in employment discrimination before Price Waterhouse. The scholarly 
criticism of the Court’s use of tort causation standards is not new, however, 
and in his 1988 article Professor Belton critiqued the pre-Price Waterhouse 
cases in which the but-for causation standard was beginning to emerge.116 
Before the tort causation standards had been fully developed and given rise to 
the problems generated by Desert Palace, Gross, and Nassar discussed below, 
scholars were criticizing the importation of tort causation standards because 
they did not accurately describe the actual phenomenon of intentional 
discrimination.117 Indeed, this is the point that Justice Breyer made in 2009 in 
his dissent in Gross: 
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for” 
causation. In that context, reasonably objective scientific or commonsense 
theories of physical causation make the concept of “but-for” causation 
comparatively easy to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an 
entirely different matter to determine a “but-for” relation when we consider, 
                                                                                                                     
 114 See, e.g., Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1055‒67 (dividing the tortification of 
employment discrimination law into three periods); Widiss, supra note 20, at 881–900 
(tracing the evolution of causation standards from Price Waterhouse through Gross).  
 115 Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1055. 
 116 See Belton, supra note 25, at 1258–69. 
 117 See, e.g., id. at 1242 (positing that “a strong argument can be made that causal 
analysis should not be as critical an element in employment discrimination law as it is in 
the law of negligence”); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of an Action 
and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 
92 (1991) (explaining that “human actions cannot be explained within the terms of causal 
theories”). 
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not physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that constitute 
motive.118 
Although early on tort causation standards were explained to be a poor fit 
for analyzing and proving the statutorily prohibited acts, it took much more 
development of the law before the causation standards would leave the 
structure of employment discrimination law in shambles.  
The Court sub silentio was laying the foundation of tortification in 1973 in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,119 renowned for its announcement of the 
now-ubiquitous pretext analysis for individual disparate treatment claims.120 
For several reasons, I think it is important to trace the tortification and cause-
in-fact importation back to McDonnell Douglas, although the Court did not 
mention tort law in the case. First, the pretext and mixed-motives proof 
frameworks, coupled as they are with particular causation standards and 
concepts of single- or mixed-motives, began with McDonnell Douglas. 
Although the Court did not suggest a causation standard that it associated with 
the pretext analysis in McDonnell Douglas,121 it later would in McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.122 The Court linked the but-for causation 
standard to the pretext analysis and developed the related idea that the analysis 
was suited to cases in which a single motive, either discriminatory or 
legitimate, caused the adverse employment action. Those ideas about the 
pretext analysis later would prompt the Court to develop a second framework 
in Price Waterhouse with a different causation standard to apply to cases of 
multiple or mixed motives. Second, McDonnell Douglas in tort-like fashion 
created a series of elements that must be proven to establish a disparate 
treatment claim. Finally, as I have argued elsewhere, the pretext framework is 
a version of the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,123 although the Court never 
labeled it as such.124 For those reasons, I begin the story of the importation of 
tort law and the adoption and development of tort causation standards with 
McDonnell Douglas. 
Although we archeologists of causation standards in employment 
discrimination law may disagree on the origin that we select, most agree that 
the development of tort causation has arrived at a sorry state. As I said earlier, 
the problem is not just one of causation standards, but also the proof structures 
                                                                                                                     
 118 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 119 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 120 The three stages with shifting burden of production are as follows: (1) plaintiff has 
burden of production on the prima facie case; (2) defendant has burden of production on a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; and (3) plaintiff has burden of production on pretext. 
Id. at 802–03.  
 121 See id.  
 122 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976). 
 123 See Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, at 478–506. 
 124 See Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1056 (noting that the three-part 
McDonnell Douglas test “does not invoke specific tort principles and does not mimic any 
particular tort”). 
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associated with them and the idea that they apply to single- or multiple-motive 
cases. For example, in Gross, the Court declared that because the ADEA 
requires but-for causation, the mixed-motives proof structure does not apply to 
age discrimination claims. Most lower courts understood that holding also to 
signal that the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis may be used for ADEA 
claims.125 Thus, the development of tort causation standards in employment 
discrimination law is responsible for not just different standards of causation 
applicable to different statutes after Gross and even different causation 
standards applicable to different provisions within the same statute in Nassar. 
That alone would be a very significant problem.126 However, the tort causation 
standards are a cause of an even more significant problem fraught with more 
uncertainty: After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,127 we have two standards of 
causation in Title VII and two proof structures—pretext and mixed motives— 
and we have no guidelines as to which applies to any given case. Although this 
may seem like a lot of blame to heap upon the causation law, it is all 
warranted. Desert Palace held that direct evidence is not required to support a 
motivating-factor jury instruction, thus erasing the only basis for deciding 
which disparate treatment cases under Title VII are evaluated under the pretext 
framework and which are evaluated under mixed motives.128 This problem is 
attributable to the development of tort causation law in employment 
discrimination law as evidenced by this progression: (1) the Court’s decision 
in Price Waterhouse creating the mixed-motives analysis with an uncertain 
standard of causation; followed by (2) Congress’s partial override and partial 
codification of Price Waterhouse in the Civil Rights Act of 1991;129 followed 
by (3) the Court’s decision in Desert Palace interpreting the 1991 Act’s 
amendment of Title VII as not requiring direct evidence to invoke the 
motivating-factor standard of causation and the mixed-motives analysis. 
In sum, I think the most significant problems in employment 
discrimination law today are a result of the adoption and development of tort 
standards of causation. Curiously, the Court could have and should have 
                                                                                                                     
 125 See, e.g., Perry v. Batesville Casket Co., 551 F. App’x 987, 989–90 (11th Cir. 
2014); Tavernier v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 498 F. App’x 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Blizzard v. Marion Technical Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 126 See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 20, at 909–20 (explaining problems that arise with the 
extension of the Gross holding requiring but-for causation).  
 127 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003). 
 128 There is a copious body of scholarship on the chaos created by Desert Palace. See, 
e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII 
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2004); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-
Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004); Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-Motive Mess: Defining 
and Applying a Mixed-Motive Framework, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461, 464–65 
(2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1650–51 (2011). 
 129 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 885–86 (describing Congress’s partial override and 
partial codification of Price Waterhouse in the Civil Rights Act of 1991).  
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stopped the tortification at Desert Palace. When the Court interpreted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, it found that Congress had adopted and codified the Price 
Waterhouse plurality’s causation standard—motivating factor. Although tort 
law recognizes several different causation standards, motivating factor is not 
one of them. Thus, Congress in the 1991 Act, reacting to the Price Waterhouse 
(primarily Justice O’Connor’s concurrence) foray into causation standards and 
tort law, codified a causation standard and a proof framework without tort 
analogues.130 The Court could have understood this as Congress’s message 
that employment discrimination law should not be so freely analogized to tort 
law and instead should be interpreted to provide more expansive protection 
and recovery. The Court did not hear such a message, and even if it had, Gross 
and Nassar suggest that it would have limited that message to section 703(m) 
of Title VII. However, in an alternate universe in which the Court interpreted 
the 1991 Act differently, Gross and Nassar may not have been decided as they 
were.131 
Beyond the tort-causation-standard debacle, it does not seem that tort law 
has caused any other substantial harm in employment discrimination law. But 
will the Staub adoption of proximate cause create problems? It already has 
caused one problem which, somewhat ironically, is interwoven with the 
Court’s adoption of cause-in-fact standards. The Court seemingly granted 
certiorari in Staub to resolve a split in the circuits on the question of cat’s paw 
liability, which arises under all of the employment discrimination statutes. It 
seems unlikely that the Court intended to resolve the issue for only one or a 
couple of the discrimination statutes.132 However, some courts have 
interpreted the Staub standard as applying to only statutes that have the 
“motivating-factor” standard of causation that USERRA has.133  
Beyond the foregoing issue—possibly adding to the asymmetry in 
employment discrimination law on yet another issue—the proximate cause 
standard in Staub could be used to prevent expansions of employment 
discrimination theories. Professor Charles Sullivan speculates that proximate 
cause could be used by the Court to hold that discrimination based on 
cognitive bias is not actionable.134 Cognitive bias is a theory of discrimination 
based on social research on biases that describes much discrimination as being 
                                                                                                                     
 130 See Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1071. 
 131 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 900–08 (imagining development of the law if Price 
Waterhouse and Gross had been decided differently). 
 132 See Lee v. Waukegan Hosp. Corp., No. 10-C-2956, 2011 WL 6028778, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 5, 2011) (“Even though Staub’s holding is not directly applicable here because it 
was not an FMLA case, its logic still is[, and] the Staub opinion clearly signaled that it was 
painting on a larger canvas . . . .”).  
 133 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 941 nn.426–33 (citing cases where the courts found 
that the Staub factor applies only to statutes that have a “motivating factor” standard). 
 134 See Sullivan, Tortifying, supra note 3, at 1476–80. 
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based on the operation of biases of which the perpetrator is unaware.135 After 
Staub, the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes136 expressed 
skepticism about the theory. Time will tell whether Sullivan’s suspicion about 
the future use of proximate cause is correct.  
In sum, it is clear that the incorporation of tort law into employment 
discrimination law is a cause (even if not a but-for cause) of the chaotic and 
asymmetrical state of the law today. Tortification need not be a bad thing for 
employment discrimination law, although to date it largely has been. So, how 
can good or better tortification be achieved?  
III. TOWARD A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 
It cannot be surprising that employment discrimination scholars write and 
speak disapprovingly of the tortification of employment discrimination law, 
given the record to date. However, we must move beyond our aversion and 
recommend a better approach for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court, and 
lower courts taking their cue from the Court, is unlikely to suddenly denounce 
the tort label or analogy. As Professor Sullivan points out, there are only so 
many principles to draw on, and tort law is not an inapt place for courts to look 
to find principles, doctrines, and constructs with which to flesh out the lean 
statutory language of discrimination law.137 Second, there are tort principles 
that the Supreme Court has not considered which may work very well in 
employment discrimination law and improve the body of law as a whole. 
There are even tort principles that might ameliorate the problems in causation. 
Thus, rather than futilely try to end the tortification of employment 
discrimination law, we would do well to try to reform it. 
There are two approaches that could achieve the needed reform. The first 
is for Congress to undertake a comprehensive review of the discrimination 
laws and to amend them, not just in its usual manner of overriding one or a 
few Court decisions with which it disagrees. The second is for the Court and 
courts to undertake the incorporation of tort law differently, approaching it 
                                                                                                                     
 135 See, e.g., id. at 1467–76. There is a large body of scholarship on cognitive bias 
discrimination. See, e.g., William T. Bielby, Applying Social Research on Stereotyping and 
Cognitive Bias to Employment Discrimination Litigation: The Case of Allegations of 
Systematic Gender Bias at Wal-Mart Stores, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 395, 396–97 (Laura Beth Nielsen & 
Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005). Dr. Bielby was the expert in the Wal-Mart v. Dukes case who 
explained the theory of “social framework analysis.” Bielby, supra, at 395. For early work 
on cognitive bias, see generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 1161 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). 
 136 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011).  
 137 See Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1079‒83. 
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with caution and due regard for differences between the common law of 
employment and statutory employment discrimination law and between tort 
law and employment discrimination law. In a perfect world, both of these 
approaches would be adopted. Although the legislative approach seems 
unlikely, adoption of the judicial approach would help.  
A. Better Statutes: Congress Should Comprehensively Review 
Employment Discrimination Law and Amend the Statutes 
Congress enacted Title VII in 1964,138 the ADEA in 1967,139 the ADA in 
1990,140 and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in 2008.141 The 
effective date of Title VII was one year after its enactment—July 2, 1965.142 
So, in 2015, we have had fifty years of employment discrimination law. Along 
the way, Congress has amended the laws. The congressional approach has 
been primarily to override Supreme Court decisions with which Congress 
disagrees. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is an example of a law that 
overrode one Supreme Court decision.143 Congress also has enacted laws that 
                                                                                                                     
 138 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 139 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)). 
 140 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
 141 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 142 Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 1965. Civil Rights 
Act § 716, 78 Stat. at 266 (stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date of 
enactment). 
 143 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in 
scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). In enacting this Act, Congress overrode Ledbetter 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Id. In Ledbetter, the Court gave a 
grudging and strict interpretation of when a timely charge of discrimination alleging 
discriminatory pay practices must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628–43. The Court held that the discrete act of a 
discriminatory pay practice triggers the running of the 180 (or 300) day charge-filing 
period; a charge must be filed within 180 days of each discrete discriminatory act. Id. at 
628. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act overturned the decision by establishing three different 
events that constitute an unlawful employment practice and commence the running of the 
charge-filing period, thus more carefully tailoring the limitations period to the various acts 
of discrimination in compensation. § 4, 123 Stat. at 6. The three events are as follows: (1) 
when a discriminatory compensation decision or practice is adopted; (2) when an 
individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or practice; or (3) 
when an individual is affected by such a decision or practice, including each time the 
individual is paid resulting from the decision or practice. Id. § 4(3). The Ledbetter Act 
amended Title VII and several other federal employment discrimination laws, as follows: 
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(3) (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
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overrode several decisions in one stroke and added some features that were not 
overrides, such as in the Civil Rights Act of 1991144 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.145 Half a century into the 
development of employment discrimination law, Congress should re-engage 
with the law by legislating in a different way. Rather than override one or 
many decisions, Congress should undertake an encyclopedic review of 
employment discrimination law followed by a comprehensive statutory 
overhaul.146 Parliament enacted such a reform of the employment 
discrimination law of the United Kingdom in the Equality Act 2010,147 and 
that type of reform is now needed in U.S. law. Among other matters, such 
reform could correct past tortification errors and set the parameters for future 
incorporation of tort law.  
Employment discrimination law at fifty years is tumultuous and 
asymmetrical, with different standards of causation governing different types 
of intentional discrimination claims, different proof frameworks applying to 
different intentional discrimination claims, and uncertainty about which 
causation standard and which proof framework apply to any given claim under 
Title VII. It is so confused that most courts have difficulty deciding whether to 
evaluate a motion for summary judgment on a Title VII claim under the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework or the statutory mixed-motives 
framework. Furthermore, if a plaintiff brought an intersectional or hybrid 
claim of discrimination based on the combination of age and sex 
(discrimination against an older woman),148 would a court apply the but-for 
                                                                                                                     
§ 12117(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 791, 794 (2012). 
 144 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 145 Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 146 I urged such an approach in earlier work. See generally William R. Corbett, Calling 
on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament’s Playbook and Fix Employment 
Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 135‒37, 144 (2013); William R. 
Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81, 99‒115 (2009). 
 147 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 149 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga_20100015_en.pdf. The European Union effected a similar 
consolidation in the 2006 Gender Recast Directive, which repealed prior sex discrimination 
directives and consolidated them in one directive. See Mark Bell, Gender Identity and 
Sexual Orientation: Alternative Pathways in EU Equality Law, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 127, 
130 (2012); Xavier B. Lutchmie Persad, An Expanding Human Rights Corpus: Sexual 
Minority Rights as International Human Rights, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 337, 355 
(2014). 
 148 Courts have not agreed about whether such intersectional claims crossing statutes 
are actionable. See generally Jourdan Day, Note, Closing the Loophole—Why 
Intersectional Claims Are Needed to Address Discrimination Against Older Women, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 447, 461‒65 (2014). 
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standard of causation required for ADEA claims after Gross or the motivating-
factor standard statutorily permitted under Title VII?149  
Employment discrimination arrived at this chaotic state because of the 
way Congress and the Supreme Court have conducted their dialogue about the 
employment discrimination laws.150 For example, Professor Deborah Widiss 
uses the Court’s decision in Gross to explain what she calls the “hydra” 
problem, whereby Congress cuts off one head of the Court’s interpretation of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, only to see more such heads grow out in Gross 
and its progeny (including Nassar, which had not been decided at the time of 
Widiss’s article).151 Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress seemed 
to have solved the Court’s indecision in Price Waterhouse over the appropriate 
standard of causation by codifying “motivating factor,”—a non-torts 
standard—only to have the basic tort standard of but-for causation grow out 
again in Gross and Nassar. Indeed, the but-for heads seem likely to proliferate 
for any statute using “because of” or similar language.152 It is the 
congressional approach of overrides, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the 
Court’s responses to it in Gross and Nassar that produced this state of affairs. 
Continuing to pursue this dysfunctional dialogue, override bills were 
introduced in Congress as the Protecting Older Workers Against 
Discrimination Act (POWADA), first after Gross,153 and then again after 
Nassar154—but they were not enacted. Justice Ginsburg in her dissent urged 
Congress to override Nassar.155 
The back-and-forth of Court decisions followed by congressional 
overrides followed by Court decisions interpreting (I think misinterpreting) the 
overrides has brought employment discrimination law to its current state. It is 
no easy task for Congress to override Court decisions and ensure that the 
Court will move in a different direction consistent with the override.156 For 
example, the POWADA bills introduced in 2009 included a blanket provision 
stating that they applied to any federal employment discrimination or 
retaliation law.157 The 2013 bills instead specifically amended the ADEA, 
Title VII, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.158 The 2009 bill 
approach risks being over-inclusive,159 and the 2013 bill approach risks being 
                                                                                                                     
 149 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 917 (recognizing this issue). 
 150 Id. at 881 (explaining “the ongoing conversation between the courts and Congress 
regarding the standard of causation in employment discrimination law”). 
 151 See id. at 877–81. 
 152 See id. at 909–20. 
 153 See S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 154 See S. 1391, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2852, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 155 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2547 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 156 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 920–26. 
 157 See S. 1756 § 3; H.R. 3721 § 3.  
 158 See S. 1391 § 3; H.R. 2852 § 3.  
 159 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 925 (explaining that there are disadvantages to 
Congress taking a blanket approach). 
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under-inclusive.160 Given the track record of congressional overrides, this 
approach simply is not a functional dialogue between the Court and Congress 
that develops coherent and accessible body of employment discrimination law 
that Congress must have intended. 
What I propose is that Congress change course and do something 
different, radical, and grand. Congress should act like Parliament. It should 
reform U.S. employment discrimination law by having a commission with 
expertise provide a comprehensive overview of the state of discrimination law 
after fifty years and recommend revised employment discrimination law. The 
United Kingdom found itself with a three-decade-old body of law, featuring 
nine antidiscrimination laws described as “outdated, fragmented, inconsistent, 
inadequate, inaccessible, and at times incomprehensible.”161 A research team, 
supported by an advisory board and panel of experts, undertook a year-long 
study that culminated in 2000 with a detailed report recommending a single 
equality act.162 That report was followed by a publication entitled 
Discrimination Law Review that reached the same recommendation in 2007.163 
Those efforts came to fruition in 2010, with one comprehensive law replacing 
the others. The review-and-recommendations stage of this process is crucial 
because Congress does not have sufficient knowledge of the problems in the 
current state of the law.164 For example, the 2009 POWADA bills expressly 
stated that the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is to be available to 
plaintiffs, and the 2013 bills appear to achieve the same result by referring not 
to McDonnell Douglas, but to “any available method of proof or analytical 
framework.”165 The decision to preserve the pretext proof structure suggests 
that Congress may not be aware of or fully appreciate the problems with proof 
structures in current employment discrimination law. Given the confusion 
created by Desert Palace and a large body of criticism of the pretext analysis, 
Congress should at least consider whether preservation of the pretext proof 
structure and a two-structure regime is the proper course of action. I am 
confident that a body could be assembled and a review produced at the behest 
of either Congress or the President.166  
                                                                                                                     
 160 For example, the Court in Nassar and Gross interpreted the 1991 Act as not 
applying to the ADEA and the antiretaliation provision of Title VII. Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2521 (2013); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 
167, 174–75 (2009). 
 161 Bob Hepple, The New Single Equality Act in Britain, EQUAL RIGHTS REV., Aug. 
2010, at 11, 13, available at http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/bob%20 
hepple.pdf. 
 162 See BOB HEPPLE ET AL., EQUALITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK—REPORT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF UK ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 1 
(2000). 
 163 Hepple, supra note 161, at 14. 
 164 See Widiss, supra note 20, at 872, 876. 
 165 H.R. 2852, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(3)(C) (2013).  
 166 Both Congress and the President have some experience in ordering studies of labor 
and employment laws. Congress ordered the Secretary of Labor to study and report on the 
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As strongly as I believe comprehensive review and revision of the 
employment discrimination statutes is the best course of action for both 
repairing the damage from the importation of tort cause-in-fact standards and 
charting a course for future migration of tort law, I am not optimistic that it 
will happen. First, employment laws, and particularly employment 
discrimination laws, are controversial laws—legislators risk votes when they 
deal with them.167 Second, in the current political climate, Congress is not 
adept at moving major bills, and particularly controversial ones.168 Finally, 
both employers and employees and civil rights advocates and opponents likely 
would be reluctant to urge Congress to undertake comprehensive review and 
reform. Both sides have won some victories along the way, and reform risks 
surrendering those wins.169  
                                                                                                                     
issue of age discrimination before enacting the ADEA. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT 
OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964 (1965). A different approach is for the President to appoint a commission. In 
early 1993, the Clinton Administration appointed the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations, better known as the Dunlop Commission for Chair John T. 
Dunlop, a former Secretary of Labor. See, e.g., Barbara Presley Noble, At Work; Labor-
Management Rorschach Test, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1994), http://query.nytimes.com/ 
gst/fullpage.html?res=9501EED61E3BF936A35755C0A962958260&sec=&spon=&pagew
anted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/NNT2-P2H6. The Commission’s charge was to 
evaluate what changes should be made in the laws governing collective bargaining “to 
enhance productivity, employee participation, labor-management cooperation, and 
resolution of workplace problems by the parties themselves.” Samuel Estreicher, The 
Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12 LAB. LAW. 117, 120 (1996). 
When the Commission delivered its recommendations in December 1994, the proposals 
were dead on arrival, coming one month after the Republicans swept into power under the 
“Contract with America.” See id. at 121. 
 167 See Michael Bologna, Hill Watchers Foresee Little Activity on the Labor and 
Employment Law Front, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 152, at C-1 (Aug. 9, 2001) (quoting 
Deron Zeppelin, director of government affairs for the Society for Human Resource 
Management, as saying, “Most members of Congress, believe it or not, do not like to vote 
on [employment] issues, period.”). Consider, for example, the tumultuous history of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress’s most ambitious revision of the employment 
discrimination laws. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Roger Clegg, 
Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 
1459, 1469 (1994). The 1991 Act was enacted after President Bush’s veto of the similar 
Civil Rights Act of 1990, which President Bush had labeled as a “quota bill.” See President 
George H.W. Bush, Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1990 2 PUB. PAPERS 1437 (Oct. 22, 1990), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/ 
research/public_papers.php?id=2345&year=1990&month=1.  
 168 Consider, for example, the inability to enact an immigration reform bill. See, e.g., 
Chris Opfer, Democrats Want Obama to Issue Orders if No House Action on Immigration 
by July 4, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 104, at A-6 (May 30, 2014). 
 169 Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment 
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 558 (2008) (“Any serious effort to 
reform employment discrimination laws would necessarily implicate some of the most 
sensitive and divisive issues of our times.”). 
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However, I remain hopeful that Congress might be up to the task. 
Although gridlock seems to characterize Congress now, enactment of the 
ADA Amendments Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in 
2008 demonstrates that passage of significant employment discrimination laws 
is possible. Moreover, though “both sides” may fear bad law as a result of such 
a reform effort, the 2008 laws suggest that good reform is possible. 
Furthermore, it seems to me that if the sides disagree strongly about an issue, 
the likely result is no legislation on that issue rather than very bad law for 
either side.170 There are risks associated with a major reform of the type I 
propose, but the alternative is leaving development of the law to the Court and 
courts, and that has not produced propitious results in recent years.  
B. Better Case Law: Courts Should Abandon the Facile Incorporation 
of Tort Law and the Lack of Reasoned Adaptation and Engage in 
Careful Analysis and Adaptation When Needed 
Regardless of our views about the significance of the Supreme Court’s use 
of the tort label and resort to tort law to interpret the employment 
discrimination statutes, scholars agree that the Court and courts should engage 
in a careful analysis to determine which specific tort concepts and principles to 
import.171 Moreover, some tort principles may be appropriate but only if 
adjustments are made so that the law serves the purposes of employment 
discrimination law.172 The careful analysis and adjustment is not happening, 
and the lack of analysis is tied to the use of the tort label. The Court majority’s 
approach in Gross, Staub, and Nassar has been to use the tort label to justify 
the importation of tort law without careful analysis or consideration of 
adaptation of the tort law being incorporated. It is important that the Supreme 
Court and lower courts undertake careful and “discriminating” analysis 
because tort law is going to continue to be applied to employment 
discrimination law, and there is some tort law that should, if adjusted 
appropriately, improve the common law of employment discrimination. 
Indeed, I can envision an employment discrimination law that is greatly 
improved by the addition of tort principles, although some such incorporations 
may be beyond the courts’ interpretive authority and may require 
congressional amendment of the statutes.  
                                                                                                                     
 170 It is possible, however, that a very muddled amendment or reform may occur, such 
as the redefinition/nonredefinition of “business necessity” in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
in which Congress did not define the term in the law. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 
1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 896, 901 (1993).  
 171 See, e.g., Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1080 (“The real problem 
for interpreting the anti-discrimination statutes is not that the Court is looking to tort law; 
rather, the problems are the Court’s choice of what tort law to look to and its failure to 
adapt tort doctrine to the goals of the anti-discrimination laws.”). 
 172 Id. at 1098–1102. 
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1. Examples of the Supreme Court’s Analysis When Borrowing Tort 
Law: Gleaning Guidelines 
Parts of the Court occasionally have performed a passable analysis of the 
tort law being considered, but it tends not to be in majority opinions. Justice 
O’Connor performed what I consider an admirable analysis in her Price 
Waterhouse concurrence from which I draw most of the guidelines that follow. 
This section considers some of the Court’s approaches, good and bad, and 
gleans from them some guidelines for how a court can conduct a good analysis 
regarding importation of tort law. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the Court adopted tort law in McDonnell 
Douglas, a version of the res ipsa analysis.173 The Court did not mention res 
ipsa and did not suggest that it was adopting tort law. Maybe it did not think of 
it as such. Here I will move on to examples in which the Court or some part of 
it acknowledges the invocation of tort law. However, I will note that I think it 
facilitates good analysis and adjustments to identify the practice of borrowing 
from tort law.  
As discussed earlier,174 Justice O’Connor is the acknowledged pioneer of 
characterizing employment discrimination law as statutory tort law.175 She 
also performed the analysis better than anyone else has. In Price Waterhouse 
the plurality did untort-like things in developing the mixed-motives framework 
for Title VII: rejecting tort’s most basic standard of cause in fact, but-for 
causation, as the test for the statutory language “because of”; adopting from 
constitutional law a mixed-motives proof structure; and adopting “motivating 
factor” as the causation standard for the mixed-motives analysis.176 Justice 
O’Connor in her concurrence labeled Title VII a “statutory employment 
tort”177 and insisted, agreeing with the Price Waterhouse dissent and the future 
majority in Gross, that the statutory language “because of” means “but-for” 
causation.178 However, she did not limit her tortification to labeling Title VII a 
tort and then using the label as a license to import tort law. Instead, she found 
that the statutory language, although requiring but-for causation, did not 
prevent dividing the causation analysis into two parts with a shifting burden of 
persuasion.179 She resorted to tort law and explained that courts in some torts 
cases involving multiple causation shift the burden of persuasion on causation 
from the plaintiff to the defendant because requiring the plaintiff to prove but-
                                                                                                                     
 173 See Corbett, Unmasking, supra note 3, at 478‒506.  
 174 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 176 See Sperino, Discrimination, supra note 3, at 17 (“The Supreme Court plurality 
opinion did not purport to draw its test from traditional common-law causation principles, 
and it specifically indicated that to equate the causal standard in Title VII as requiring ‘but-
for’ cause is to misunderstand it.”). 
 177 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 178 Id. at 262–63  
 179 Id. at 263. 
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for causation would harm the deterrence function of tort law.180 She 
considered the two objectives shared by tort law and employment 
discrimination law: deterrence and compensation (making whole injured 
persons).181 She settled on “substantial factor,” a tort standard of causation, as 
the appropriate standard to trigger the deterrence objective, noting that a lower 
standard would not justify a departure from the usual rule that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of persuasion.182 When that level of causation is proven, the 
employer has the burden of persuasion to prove that it would have made the 
same decision. O’Connor found an analogue for that structure already extant in 
employment discrimination law in the remedial phase of class action systemic 
disparate treatment cases.183 She explained why the mixed-motives two-part 
analysis drawn from constitutional analysis was appropriate for analyzing 
disparate treatment discrimination claims,184 why the new proof structure was 
needed to supplement McDonnell Douglas,185 and why the new structure 
would not conflict with other congressional policies embodied in Title VII.186 
She further justified the shifting burden of the framework by saying that a rule 
that kept the burden on plaintiff to prove but-for causation in all cases would 
disserve the deterrent purpose of Title VII.187  
Professor Sperino characterizes Justice O’Connor’s concurrence as not 
having the “rigid formality” of later cases because she separated the questions 
of the causation standard and placement of the burden of persuasion.188 I agree 
with that assessment, but I wish to go beyond that and say that the architect of 
tortification of employment discrimination law knew how to do it the right 
way and demonstrated how to conduct an analysis justifying the incorporation 
of a tort principle with appropriate modification. From her concurring opinion, 
I glean several guidelines for analysis. First, ask whether the statutory 
language permits resorting to tort law and to the particular tort law under 
consideration for incorporation.189 The dissent reasoned that the statutory 
language required but-for causation, and although Justice O’Connor agreed, 
she found room within that requirement to craft a more innovative approach 
                                                                                                                     
 180 Id. at 263–64 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984)). 
 181 See id. at 264–66.  
 182 Id. at 265–66. 
 183 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266. 
 184 Id. at 267–70 (stating that she “cannot believe that Congress intended Title VII to 
accord more deference to a private employer” that the evidence substantially proves 
discriminated on a prohibited basis).  
 185 Id. at 272. 
 186 Id. at 274. 
 187 Id. at 278. 
 188 Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1058‒59 . Professor Sullivan also finds the 
approaches of the various opinions to be unobjectionable. See Sullivan, Is There a 
Madness, supra note 21, at 1096‒97. 
 189 See Sullivan, Is There a Madness, supra note 21, at 1083 (“[R]esort to tort . . . or 
anything else[], is permissible (in theory at least) only when Congress has not carefully 
enough defined the parameters of the inquiry.”). 
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that better accomplished the objectives of the law as applied to the facts. 
Second, recognize in the analysis the shared objectives of tort law and 
employment discrimination law, but emphasize the preeminence of the 
deterrence objective in discrimination and ensure that the tort principle 
selected serves that objective. Third, explain why the current state of 
employment discrimination law is inadequate to address the question before 
the court and why resort is being had to tort law. Fourth, examine different 
standards in tort law. Herein lies one of the most egregious missteps of the 
Court in recent cases: the Court seizes upon a tort principle without adequately 
exploring the range of standards, tests, etc. available. Justice O’Connor looked 
to a subset of tort law, multiple causation cases, to find the tort standard she 
imported. What the Court has done in recent opinions is take a quick glance at 
the most basic level of tort law—really, a caricature of a complex and nuanced 
body of law.190 Substantial factor was a secondary tort standard of causation 
drawn from multiple causation cases, and a shifting burden of persuasion—
which ultimately requires the defendant to disprove but-for causation—was 
drawn from the innovative torts case Summers v. Tice and constitutional law. 
Thus, O’Connor probed thoroughly in tort causation law and found a standard 
used not in the most basic torts cases, but a standard used in tort law to address 
precisely the issue she had encountered in employment discrimination law—
uncertainty about causation. The foregoing description of what Justice 
O’Connor did in surveying and probing tort law suggests a fifth guideline: a 
court incorporating tort law should consider modifications that may be 
necessary for the principle, standard, or doctrine to function well and 
adequately serve the purposes of employment discrimination law. Thus, 
Justice O’Connor did not blithely apply the tort label and adopt the most basic 
principle of tort law she could find without adaptation. She chose tort law 
addressing the specific problem and adjusted it, with a shifting burden of 
persuasion, to satisfy both her understanding of the statutory language 
(ultimately requiring but-for causation) and to better achieve the deterrence 
function of Title VII (by permitting recovery in some cases of uncertainty 
regarding causation). Although Congress subsequently disagreed with the 
substantial factor standard of causation in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the 
effect of the same-decision defense, that does not detract from the quality of 
Justice O’Connor’s analysis. Indeed, I think the better argument is that Justice 
O’Connor did the most that she thought the statutory language permitted in 
terms of causation standards with both the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the 
effect of the employer’s proving, under the same-decision defense, no but-for 
causation. Lowering the prima facie case standard of causation to “motivating 
factor” and imposing liability even if the employer proved no but-for causation 
required congressional amendment of the statute. Moreover, Price Waterhouse 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 constitutes a healthy and productive dialogue 
                                                                                                                     
 190 See Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1058.  
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between the Court and Congress about the state of employment discrimination 
law.  
The majority opinion in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. provides an 
example of a poor approach to tortification,191 and Justice Breyer’s dissent is 
an example of a well-reasoned of the rejection of importing a tort principle 
into discrimination law. Gross has been criticized on many grounds by many 
commentators,192 but I limit the criticism here to the discussion and lack of 
discussion of adopting a torts standard. The Court majority brushed aside the 
question on which it granted certiorari—whether a mixed-motives analysis 
under the ADEA requires direct evidence (essentially whether the holding of 
Desert Palace extends to the ADEA)—and decided instead whether the 
mixed-motives framework is even applicable to the ADEA. The majority did 
not apply the tort label expressly (i.e., did not call the ADEA a tort), but it did 
cite a torts treatise, among other sources, in support of its interpretation of the 
statutory language “because of” as meaning but-for causation.193 There is no 
analysis of the propriety of adopting the tort standard of causation. Perhaps 
this is not surprising because the majority repudiates most of what was said in 
the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion and O’Connor’s concurring opinion, 
saying that if the Court were considering the issue for the first time it might 
not adopt the approach194—apparently referring to the approach largely 
codified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Justice Breyer, 
dissenting in Gross, urged the Court to consider the difference in applying but-
for causation in torts cases and employment discrimination cases before glibly 
adopting but-for causation because it is used in tort law.195 He demonstrated 
the importance of such analysis, pointing out that but-for causation may 
function well enough when applied to the physical forces in torts cases, but it 
is likely to be more difficult when applied to determine the causal role of 
mental states in employment discrimination.196 This was by no means a novel 
critique of why but-for causation is a bad fit for employment discrimination 
law,197 but it illustrates an important guideline for deciding whether to import 
tort law—consider differences in what is being regulated by the different 
bodies of law.198 Those differences may mean that the principle should not be 
                                                                                                                     
 191 See Gross v. Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 192 See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 858 (2010); 
Widiss, supra note 20, at 880 (“Gross has quickly caused widespread upheaval and 
confusion . . . .”). 
 193 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–77 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 265). 
 194 See id. at 179.  
 195 See id. at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 196 See id. at 190–91. 
 197 See, e.g., Gudel, supra note 117, at 88–89. 
 198 Although Justice Breyer did not discuss it, an additional difference in causation in 
tort law and employment discrimination law is that the focus on but-for causation in tort 
law is under a negligence theory, whereas the disparate treatment theory of discrimination 
to which it is being applied in employment discrimination is based on intent. The question 
in negligence is who or what caused the harm. In employment discrimination disparate 
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incorporated or that it should be only after modification, as Justice O’Connor 
had advocated in her Price Waterhouse concurrence.  
Although the Court used the tort label in University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar,199 the case simply extended the holding of Gross to 
the “because of” language in the antiretaliation provision of Title VII. The 
Court did express concern that interpreting the antiretaliation provision as 
having a lower standard of causation would permit many frivolous claims to 
survive summary judgment.200 Such reasoning demonstrates the Court’s 
fixation on the common law of employment that emphasizes employer 
prerogative and control, as manifested in the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Nassar is also notable for Justice Ginsburg in dissent calling for Congress to 
override the decision. As discussed above, I think Congress should forego 
single-decision overrides and overhaul the statutes.  
Finally, the Court majority in Staub v. Proctor Hospital201 did a poor job 
of explaining why it was importing proximate cause. The Court began by 
applying the label: “[W]hen Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the 
background of general tort law.”202 The Court was announcing a standard to 
resolve a circuit split on the cat’s paw issue—under what circumstances 
liability is to be imposed on an employer as a result of a subordinate’s 
discriminatory intent being attributed to a supervisor who is the actual 
decisionmaker regarding the adverse job action. The Court briefly discussed 
agency law before announcing that “[p]roximate cause requires only ‘some 
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,’ 
and excludes only those ‘link[s] that are too remote, purely contingent, or 
indirect.’”203 The Court also explained how the proximate cause subsidiary 
principles of superseding cause and intervening cause relate to the analysis.204 
Interspersed are discussions of intent, including an odd footnote explaining the 
                                                                                                                     
treatment claims, we know who caused the harm, and the question is why. A better tort 
analogue may be found in the intentional tort pocket. Although the foregoing describes the 
state of disparate treatment law in the U.S., discrimination theory need not be focused on 
the employer’s state of mind. In the European Union, direct discrimination cases, which are 
the analogues of disparate treatment, do not focus on hostile intent. See Bob Hepple, The 
European Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 605, 614 (“Unlike 
American federal law, liability for direct discrimination (less favorable treatment on racial 
grounds) under British and EU law does not depend on establishing a discriminatory intent 
or purpose on the part of the alleged wrongdoer. It is sufficient to show that but for the 
claimant’s race, he or she would not have been differently treated. The absence of a hostile 
intent or the presence of a benign motive for the differential treatment is irrelevant.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
 199 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013). 
 200 Id. at 2531–32. 
 201 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
 202 Id. at 1191. 
 203 Id. at 1192 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)). 
 204 Id.  
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intentional tort doctrine of transferred intent, which goes on to say it does not 
apply to the facts of the case.205  
The Staub Court did provide some analysis to support its adoption of 
proximate cause, but it is poor analysis. First, the Court wrote about 
intentional torts and causation, never even acknowledging that this blending 
would be unusual under tort law.206 When the Court stated that if the dismissal 
was not the object of the subordinates’ reports, it may have been the result,207 
it seemed to be moving in the direction of the two-pronged definition of intent 
in tort law: purpose or knowledge to a substantial certainty.208 Then, it quickly 
ventured into negligence concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause. 
Although I do not mean to suggest that such a modification of tort concepts 
could not be appropriate for discrimination laws, good analysis should explain 
the reason for such a modification. Another troubling feature of the 
tortification in Staub is that the Court was adopting one of the most amorphous 
and troubling concepts in tort law as the standard for what seems a rather 
straightforward employment discrimination issue, and proximate cause was a 
standard that had received almost no support or mention in the lower courts 
before Staub.209 Proximate cause has been deemed so unhelpful in tort law that 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts recommends abandoning it.210 Overall, my 
criticism of the Staub analysis is that its use of proximate cause seems like a 
sloppy description of tort law that does little to support importation of a 
concept that has a troublesome track record in its home body of law.  
In sum, the Supreme Court or justices, concurring or dissenting, have 
demonstrated both good and bad analysis for incorporating tort law into 
employment discrimination law. The following guidelines can be gleaned from 
the opinions, although this certainly is not an exhaustive list. First, consider 
the statutory language and determine whether it permits importation of tort law 
and what parameters it establishes. Second, recognize the differences in the 
objectives of employment discrimination law and tort law as well as their 
similarities; the employment discrimination laws are expressions of strong 
public policy and deterrence of discrimination is the paramount objective. This 
                                                                                                                     
 205 Id. at 1192 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435, 435B cmt. a 
(1965)). 
 206 See, e.g., Sperino, Tort Label, supra note 3, at 1079 (“[T]he causal inquiry is not of 
key importance in intentional tort cases . . . .”).  
 207 Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191.  
 208 See Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Wash. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
 209 But see, e.g., Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1253 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[A] 
plaintiff must show that the allegedly biased investigator’s discriminatory reports, 
recommendation, or other actions were the proximate cause of the adverse employment 
action.”). 
 210 The Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces “proximate cause” with “scope of 
liability,” explaining that proximate cause is a poor term to describe the idea embodied in 
the term. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, ch. 
6, special note on proximate cause (2010). 
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prioritizing of deterrence and public policy over individual compensation may 
lead a court to be less stringent in what it requires of employment 
discrimination plaintiffs than tort plaintiffs or to be more rigorous in the 
requirements it imposes on employment discrimination defendants trying to 
avoid liability. Third, address why the current statutory and common law of 
employment discrimination law is not adequate to address the issue. Fourth, 
survey in detail tort law relevant to the issue, look for treatment of analogous 
issues in tort law (as Justice O’Connor did in her Price Waterhouse 
concurrence and the Gross majority did not), consider any alternatives offered 
by tort law, and explain why the one chosen is an appropriate choice. Under 
this guideline, it is appropriate to consider the performance (track record) of 
the principle in tort law. For example, is it among the most controversial and 
amorphous principles in tort law, like proximate cause? Is it old tort law that is 
being replaced with newer principles? Fifth, consider what differences, such as 
mental states compared with physical acts, might render implementation of the 
tort principle more problematic in discrimination law. Sixth, if a tort principle 
or doctrine seems serviceable, consider what modifications may be needed to 
make it work well in discrimination law. No doubt there are other guidelines 
that could be harvested from court opinions or other sources, but I think the 
foregoing considerations would lead to better analyses and decisions regarding 
adoption of tort principles in discrimination law. I do not suggest that courts 
should be bound to a mechanical recitation and application of these guidelines. 
Given the debacle of causation in employment discrimination law, I almost 
would favor a rebuttable presumption that tort law should not be imported. 
However, unless and until Congress provides more detail in the statutes, the 
common law of employment discrimination is likely to grow and need to 
grow, and tort law is not a bad reservoir of common law. Moreover, as I 
explain below, there is tort law that could perhaps ameliorate the causation 
mess in employment discrimination law.  
2. Experimenting with the Guidelines: Considering Possible 
Incorporations of Tort Law 
My principal project has been to suggest ways that Congress and the 
courts can determine under what circumstances and how to import tort law 
into employment discrimination law. I do not intend to evaluate all tort 
principles that could be imported. However, considering a couple of tort 
principles may be instructive. First, the concept of assumption of the risk has 
received some attention and consideration in sexual harassment law. I think 
that tort concept is a poor candidate for incorporation, and I shall demonstrate 
that using the proposed guidelines. The concept of proportional liability, which 
the tort law of the United States recognizes in some versions, such as 
enterprise liability and lost chance of survival, seems to me to be a promising 
candidate to improve upon the morass that is employment discrimination 
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causation law, although I have some doubt that the statutory language should 
be interpreted as permitting adoption of proportional liability.  
Assumption of the risk is a tort doctrine providing an affirmative defense, 
barring a plaintiff’s recovery when the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly 
encounters a risk.211 The idea has surfaced in sexual harassment law in the 
context of workplaces that are sexy, rugged, or—at least in one case—creative. 
The idea was raised regarding the Hooters restaurant chain being sued by 
several former waitresses for sexual harassment, alleging that the employer 
established an environment in which customers felt free to engage in sexual 
conduct and talk directed at the waitresses.212 Although I am unaware of a 
court that has expressly adopted the defense in such a fact situation, a 
California appellate court accepted a version of assumption of the risk in Lyle 
v. Warner Brothers Television Productions.213 In that case, a writer’s assistant 
for the television show Friends sued for sexual harassment, alleging that she 
was required to sit in writers’ meetings preparing material for the shows, and 
the meetings were permeated with salacious talk and vulgar jokes while 
discussing ideas for story lines, jokes, and dialog for the show.214 The 
defendants argued, and prevailed at the appellate court level, that creative 
necessity required license to talk about such matters.215 The opinion later was 
superseded.216 There is also an idea that a certain level of rough and sexual 
talk, and perhaps conduct, must be accepted when one takes a job with a 
“rugged environment.”217 For example, in a recent opinion, the Fifth Circuit 
decided that a construction worker who was subjected to egregious sexual 
conduct and language by his supervisor could establish same-sex sexual 
harassment via the gender stereotyping theory in EEOC v. Boh Brothers 
Construction Co., LLC.218 The dissent embraced the idea that some vulgar 
conduct is to be expected in some workplaces. The dissent satirized the 
majority opinion, by drafting an “Etiquette for Ironworkers” memorandum, 
and suggested it as a way for employers to avoid liability in light of the 
majority opinion.219  
                                                                                                                     
 211 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965); DOBBS, supra note 43, 
§ 211. 
 212 See generally Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk 
Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. 
REV. 1107, 1108‒09 (1995).  
 213 Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004). 
 214 See id. at 513. 
 215 See id. at 512. 
 216 See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 94. P.3d 476, 476 (Cal. 2004).  
 217 See Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 194, 201 (4th Cir. 
2000) (rejecting the idea that such a workplace culture is acceptable due to the “rugged 
environment”). 
 218 EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 219 Id. at 475 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
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There obviously has not been an outpouring of support to adopt 
assumption of the risk or its variants in sexual harassment law, but it is a tort 
doctrine that could be imported to the most tortlike of all discrimination 
claims. How would the type of analysis that I have suggested evaluate the 
incorporation of assumption of the risk? First, the statutory language does not 
seem to prohibit or constrain adoption of the tort doctrine because harassment 
theory is not expressly provided for in the statutes but is largely created and 
developed by case law, which is a good reason for Congress to overhaul and 
update the laws. Second, consideration of the prominence of the deterrence 
objective in discrimination law would support not adopting a version of 
assumption of risk even in the face of the argument that the compensation 
objective is not as strong because the person took a job knowing what she was 
facing. Employers will not be deterred from tolerating sexual harassment in 
some types of jobs if they can rely on an assumption-of-the-risk defense. 
Indeed, employers might use the concept to insulate themselves from liability 
by warning employees at the time of hire that there are risks of harassment 
inherent in the job. Thus, the preeminent discrimination objective of 
deterrence would be undermined rather than supported by adoption of the tort 
concept. Third, current sexual harassment law has sufficient capacity to 
address the issue. One of the elements of a hostile environment claim is 
unwelcomeness.220 Although many courts do not like this element and 
describe welcome harassment as an oxymoron,221 the element provides a way 
of analyzing employees’ conduct in the job without importing assumption of 
the risk. Moreover, the courts’ misgivings about unwelcomeness militate 
against bringing in a related tort concept. Fourth, considering the performance 
of assumption of the risk in tort law, it seems to be an antiquated defense, with 
some states abolishing it because it can be subsumed within comparative fault, 
which may reduce, without barring recovery.222 As will be discussed further 
below, the trend in tort law in the United States and much of the world has 
been away from all-or-nothing approaches. I do not think an analysis would 
need to proceed any further to reject assumption of the risk as a candidate for 
importation into discrimination law. 
The other tort principle or doctrine that I wish to evaluate is proportional 
liability. Thus, we move from consideration of the old and fading tort doctrine 
of assumption of the risk to consideration of a modern cutting-edge tort 
doctrine. We do not use the term proportional liability generally in the United 
                                                                                                                     
 220 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2014) (defining hostile workplace as including 
“unwelcome sexual advances”); see also supra note 55 (discussing courts’ statements of 
the required elements of a sexual harassment hostile environment claim). 
 221 E.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
 222 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 2 cmt. c (2000); 
see, e.g., Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123. 1125 (La. 1988).  
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States,223 but we are familiar with and accept some subsets—comparative 
fault, lost chance of survival, and market share liability.224 More generally, 
proportional liability is apportionment of liability for a harm among a plaintiff 
and defendants based on either comparative fault or comparative causal 
risk.225 It is endorsed by the European Group on Tort Law in the Principles of 
European Tort Law.226 Common to both the comparative causation and 
comparative fault subsets is the idea that recovery in tort need not be all or 
nothing. Comparative fault obviously is well accepted in the United States 
with all but about five U.S. jurisdictions having moved from contributory 
negligence to some version of comparative fault.227 We have far less 
acceptance of and experience with comparative causation. In cases of 
uncertainty about causation, proportional liability “impos[es] liability on an 
otherwise liable defendant based on the probability that the defendant’s 
tortious conduct was a cause of plaintiff’s harm.”228 The American Law 
Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Torts does not adopt a general theory of 
proportional liability.229  
Because I wish to analyze the suitability of proportional causation230 for 
employment discrimination law, I am putting to one side the subset of 
comparative fault, although I think it is worth considering whether 
                                                                                                                     
 223 See Michael D. Green, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in the US, in 
PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 343, 343 
(European Ctr. of Tort & Ins. Law ed., 2013) (stating that proportional liability is not 
defined in U.S. tort law).  
 224 See id. at 343–44; Oliphant, supra note 45, at 1605–06. 
 225 See, e.g., Israel Gilead et al., General Report: Causal Uncertainty and Proportional 
Liability: Analytical and Comparative Report, in PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL 
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 223, at 1. 
 226 EUROPEAN GRP. ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT & 
COMMENTARY arts. 3:105, 3:106 (2005)). This acceptance does acknowledge, however, 
that the case for proportional liability is strongest when the probability distribution based 
on specific facts is limited, and the case weakens as the range of probabilities widens. Id. 
art. 3:106, ¶ 15; cf. Michael D. Green, Introduction: The Third Restatement of Torts in a 
Crystal Ball, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 993, 995 (2011). 
 227 See Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative 
Fault Negligence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 948–50 (2012). 
 228 See Green, supra note 226, at 994. 
 229 See id.; Oliphant, supra note 45, at 1605–06 (“[N]either the theory, nor the 
published work that supports it, is paid much attention in the Third Restatement; nowhere 
are the pros and cons of proportional-liability squarely addressed. Instead, the Third 
Restatement . . . focuses on only one species of proportional-liability approach—the award 
of damages for loss-of-chance.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 230 I sometimes will use the term “proportional causation” to distinguish the concept 
from comparative fault. I realize that the term is objectionable under a theory of 
proportional liability that views the standard of causation as remaining the same and the 
compensable harm as changing. I find the case more persuasive for a theory of proportional 
liability that recognizes a change in the standard of causation. See infra note 231 and 
accompanying text.  
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comparative fault should be adopted in discrimination law or parts of 
discrimination law.231 In the United States, most jurisdictions now recognize a 
subset of proportional causation in the lost-chance-of-survival theory in 
medical malpractice cases, principally but not exclusively wrongful death. 
Tracing its origin to Professor Joseph King’s article,232 a majority of U.S. 
jurisdictions recognize some version of the theory.233 It has been suggested 
that lost chance could be used in employment discrimination law,234 and one 
federal appellate court has—while not holding it applicable—commented 
favorably on it in Doll v. Brown.235 
How would proportional liability or lost chance fare under the analysis 
that I have recommended for evaluating incorporation of tort law into 
employment discrimination law? Whereas assumption of the risk was, in my 
view, easily resolved as unacceptable, the answer for proportional liability is 
far from clear. First, does the statutory language permit such incorporation? 
Based on the Court’s limitation in Gross and Nassar of the “because of” 
language to mean but-for causation, it seems that the analysis might end here 
with the conclusion that the language does not permit the interpretation, except 
for the discrimination (not antiretaliation) provisions of Title VII. With 
“motivating factor” in Title VII, there is no obvious statutory obstacle to 
incorporation of proportional liability (proportional causation) for Title VII. 
However, there is an argument regarding lost chance in tort law that might 
circumvent the but-for problem in the other statutes. The Restatement (Third) 
                                                                                                                     
 231 Professor Katz discusses tort law’s comparative fault allocation scheme as a way of 
ameliorating all-or-nothing windfalls to either plaintiffs or defendants, but he recognizes 
that there is no precedent for a comparative fault regime in employment discrimination 
law. See Katz, supra note 192, at 887–88. I think that comparative fault is not as well-
suited to employment discrimination law as proportional causation/lost chance because 
often the nondiscriminatory reasons are not fault based, such as when an employer takes an 
adverse employment action due in part to economic reasons. Still, a comparative fault 
regime that permits assignment of a percentage to the discriminatory reason could achieve 
the same result as lost chance. A proportional liability system that permits assignment of a 
percentage chance that discrimination caused an action would improve upon the all-or-
nothing problem of current standards. Although one may argue that the current statutory 
mixed-motives analysis is not all or nothing because the same-decision defense does not 
avoid liability, it does preclude almost all monetary relief for the plaintiff. Moreover, after 
Nassar, mixed motives is likely limited to Title VII discrimination claims. 
 232 Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts 
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1363–70 
(1981).  
 233 See Green, supra note 223, at 362. The first reported judicial decision to adopt the 
approach was Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983) (en 
banc). 
 234 See Paul M. Secunda, A Public Interest Model for Applying Lost Chance Theory to 
Probabilistic Injuries in Employment Discrimination Cases, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 747, 784–
91 (advancing a “public interest approach for remedying probabilistic injuries in 
employment discrimination litigation”). 
 235 Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1207 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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of Torts and most state courts take the position that lost chance recovery 
entails not a change in the standard of causation, but a change in the 
compensable harm.236 That is, the plaintiff must prove that a chance of 
survival would not have been lost but for the defendant’s breach. For example, 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected the argument that lost chance of 
survival is a relaxation of the usual tort causation and quantum of proof 
standards in Smith v. State.237 The court said:  
[A]llowing such recovery is a recognition of the loss of a chance of survival 
as a distinct compensable injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, to be 
distinguished from the loss of life in wrongful death cases, and there is no 
variance from the usual burden in proving that distinct loss.238  
While the merit and persuasiveness of this characterization of lost 
chance—a different compensable harm, not a different standard of causation—
are debatable, it is a view of lost chance that may render it acceptable even 
under the but-for interpretation of Gross and Nassar. Such a creative rationale 
for working within the statutory language is reminiscent of Justice O’Connor’s 
approach to but-for causation in Price Waterhouse. It also seems to me that a 
move toward proportional liability is consistent with Congress’s codification 
of a mixed-motives analysis in Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
Motivating factor is a standard of causation below but for, and the same-
decision defense does not avoid liability, but mitigates the award. My 
conclusion on the first guideline of whether the statutory language permits 
adoption of proportional liability (proportional causation) is mixed: probably 
for Title VII and probably not for the other statutes and antiretaliation 
provisions under current Supreme Court interpretations unless lost chance is 
defined as a change in the compensable harm rather than the standard of 
causation. The uncertainty about the limits of the statutory language causes me 
to return to my point that the best way to accomplish development of 
employment discrimination law through incorporation of tort law is for 
Congress to re-engage and amend the statutes.  
Second, is incorporation of proportional liability consistent with 
deterrence being the preeminent objective of discrimination law? It has been 
argued by one of the proponents of lost chance in U.S. tort law that it improves 
the deterrent effect of tort law,239 but that argument is contested.240 At a 
minimum, it seems likely that proportional liability—being perceived as a 
                                                                                                                     
 236 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. f (2010) (“[T]here are times when courts recognize new, unusual, or reconceptualized 
harms, which change the causal inquiry.”). 
 237 Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996). 
 238 Id. at 547. 
 239 See John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort 
Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063, 1068–69 (1989). 
 240 See Green, supra note 223, at 344–45.  
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lower standard of causation, like motivating factor—would increase the 
number of plaintiffs recovering, although the awards under the scheme would 
be adjusted.241 If employers knew that there was a greater chance of a plaintiff 
recovering some award, would that deter discrimination? A corollary under 
current law is whether employers are less concerned with losing cases under 
the but-for standard after Gross and Nassar. Although I cannot empirically 
support the answer, it seems to me that proportional liability might improve 
deterrence because, at a minimum, attorneys advise their employer clients on 
changes in the law and what those changes mean. Presumably, Congress had 
the deterrence objective in mind when it chose “motivating factor,” a lenient 
(plaintiff-friendly) causation standard, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
Third, is proportional liability needed because the current state of 
employment discrimination law is inadequate to address the issue? Perhaps the 
best start to answering this question is that causation is, as explained above, 
one of the biggest messes in employment discrimination law. As my answer 
immediately above to the first guideline suggests, adoption of lost chance may 
not clean up the asymmetry created by Gross and Nassar. However, I think 
that proportional liability, if it could be implemented in employment 
discrimination, has the potential to displace all other causation standards. The 
Supreme Court of Texas, in rejecting lost chance in the most generally 
accepted tort context of medical malpractice, explained that it could not see 
any reasoned basis for limiting the spread of lost chance to other torts cases 
beyond medical malpractice: “[I]t is doubtful that there is any principled way 
we could prevent its application to similar actions involving other 
professions.”242 I conclude that proportional liability has the potential to 
ameliorate some of the confusion and other problems created by the Court’s 
development of the causation law in employment discrimination law.  
Fourth, in evaluating proportional liability or lost chance in tort law, the 
analogue seems at least as good as the other cause-in-fact standards adopted in 
discrimination law, although not perfect. The purpose of this lower standard of 
causation in tort law is to address cases of uncertainty about causation. One of 
the principal criticisms of but-for causation applied to employment 
discrimination is the greater difficulty (than in tort law) posed by determining 
whether an adverse job action would have been taken in the absence of a 
discriminatory motive, as Justice Breyer argued in his Gross dissent.243 The 
Summers v. Tice case cited by Justice O’Connor in her Price Waterhouse 
concurrence, which she used to support her shifting of the burden to the 
defendant to prove no but-for causation, is a case of uncertainty regarding 
                                                                                                                     
 241 Under the Court’s rationale in Nassar, the Court majority likely would find that a 
proportional liability regime would exacerbate the potential for frivolous claims. See Univ. 
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531–32 (2013). 
 242 Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex. 1993). 
 243 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); supra text accompanying note 118. 
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causation,244 and Congress codified that aspect of the mixed-motives 
framework in Title VII. One may argue, as the dissent did in Price 
Waterhouse, that the but-for causation standard is preserved at stage two of 
mixed motives (the same-decision defense); however, that is not true in the 
statutory version which provides for limitation of remedies rather than 
avoidance of liability. Regarding a survey that considers the full range of tort 
law, causation standards have been borrowed from tort law, and this could be 
seen as the next step. Tort law throughout the world245 is characterized by a 
movement away from the all-or-nothing approach to recovery.246 This 
movement is manifested in the United States broadly in the movement to 
comparative fault and more narrowly in the spread of lost chance of survival.  
United States tort law, however, has not broadly accepted the concept, 
theory, or doctrine of proportional causation, as indicated in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts.247 Although there is an analogous situation of uncertainty 
about causation in tort law and employment discrimination law, the general 
adoption of proportional liability/lost chance in employment discrimination 
would take it beyond U.S. tort law. Given the greater difficulty of proving 
causation in employment discrimination, moving beyond tort law on the 
causation issue may be justified. Another possibility is for the incorporation of 
lost chance in employment discrimination to mimic U.S. tort law—to apply 
lost chance to only a particular subset of uncertainty-regarding-causation 
cases. Similarly, and based on the O’Connor concurrence in Price 
Waterhouse, the motivating-factor causation standard (and mixed-motives 
analysis) was limited to cases involving direct evidence. However, that line of 
demarcation always was problematic, and it was eradicated by Desert Palace 
v. Costa. Thus, a limited subset of uncertain causation cases in employment 
discrimination cases does not occur to me. In sum, the consideration of the tort 
law analogue and consideration of the track record of proportional liability in 
tort law yields a mixed verdict on which way that guideline gravitates. The 
close analogy between the issue in the two bodies of law and the general trend 
or movement of tort law causes me to think it favors an adoption of some 
version of proportional liability.  
Fifth, in considering the differences that may make the principle more 
difficult to apply in employment discrimination law than in tort law, it is worth 
noting that the argument for proportional liability in tort law may be stronger 
based on a difference in the wrong addressed by the two bodies of law. As 
Justice Breyer argued in his Gross dissent: it is conceptually harder to apply 
but-for causation to mental states and acts than physical acts and physical 
harm. On the other hand, and perhaps weakening the argument for extension 
                                                                                                                     
 244 See, e.g., Green, supra note 223, at 356. 
 245 See, e.g., EUROPEAN GRP. ON TORT LAW, supra note 226, arts. 3:105, 3:106.  
 246 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 
VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1996). 
 247 See Green, supra note 223, at 343–44; Oliphant, supra note 45, at 1607. 
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of proportional liability to discrimination law, in tort law when proportional 
liability is employed in a negligence analysis, a wrongful act—a breach of the 
standard of care—already has been established and the question is limited to 
whether the wrong caused a harm. In contrast, in employment discrimination 
law the question of wrongfulness is not separate from causation: an adverse 
employment action is not wrongful unless caused by a discriminatory motive. 
In this way the “because of” statutory language defining the unlawful 
employment practice does state a distinction that makes a difference, perhaps 
supporting a requirement of stronger causal connection in employment 
discrimination law.  
Regarding the sixth factor, I do not have many suggestions for 
modification because I have not fully worked through a theory of proportional 
liability for employment discrimination law. I will suggest, however, that 
given the requirement of causation for a wrongful act in employment 
discrimination law and Justice O’Connor’s having worked through these 
issues and problems of importing tort causation standards to address 
uncertainty regarding causation in employment discrimination, the 
proportional liability principle might be woven into the statutory mixed-
motives analysis.248 The first stage of motivating factor might be preserved 
whereby the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of wrongfulness, and then 
the burden shifts to the employer to disprove causation. Rather than permitting 
the employer to prove it would have made the same decision for 
nondiscriminatory reasons (negating but-for causation) and thereby limiting 
the remedies (no money to the plaintiff), the employer could disprove 
causation to whatever extent it could, subject to the factfinder’s determination, 
and the recovery would be proportional to the level of causation proven. Given 
the damage caps in section 1981a,249 proportional recovery could result in 
small awards of compensatory damages. This contrasts with tort law in which 
such damage limitations generally do not exist. This adaptation of 
incorporating proportional liability into the mixed-motives framework would, 
of course, require statutory amendment.  
As the foregoing examples demonstrate, application of these suggested 
guidelines for considering incorporation of tort law into employment 
discrimination law does not necessarily yield an obvious answer. For 
assumption of the risk, I think the answer is clear, but for proportional 
liability/lost chance it is not. Yet, I think the guidelines yield the type of 
careful and discerning analysis that is needed to make good decisions. Such 
analysis could result in consideration of the full range of relevant tort law and 
importation of tort law, perhaps adjusted, that actually both fleshes out and 
improves employment discrimination law.  
                                                                                                                     
 248 See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law: Does 
the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
683, 723–24 (2010). 
 249 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012).  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The reaction in the scholarship to the tortification of employment 
discrimination law has not been positive, and “tortification” and “tort label” 
generally have not been words of praise directed at the Court. The more fully 
developed body of tort law has, however, been a source of law for 
employment discrimination for many years, and it will continue to be. 
Scholars generally agree that the migration of tort law to employment 
discrimination does not necessarily worsen the latter. However, the story of 
the incorporation of tort causation standards has not been felicitous, and the 
recent tales in Gross and Nassar have been particularly bad, exposing the 
dysfunctional dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court about the 
development and direction of discrimination law. I have not attempted to 
catalogue all tort law that should and should not be imported to discrimination 
law. Instead, I have argued that, at the half-century mark in the life of 
discrimination law, Congress needs to re-engage in the process in a significant 
way, overhauling and updating the laws, much as Parliament did in the 
Equality Act 2010. Regardless of whether that happens (and I am doubtful that 
it will), I have offered some guidelines for tort migration analysis that the 
Court and courts can use to achieve a better quality of analysis, similar to that 
conducted by Justice O’Connor in her Price Waterhouse concurrence. On the 
hundredth anniversary of employment discrimination law, perhaps scholars 
will look back and laud the development and enhancement of employment 
discrimination law through the incorporation of tort law.  
  

